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PREFACE 
This thesis was not designed and is not presented as a practical 
study which advances solutions for the UHF-VHF allocations problem. It 
offers at most a commentary on the history of that problem. A great deal 
of excellent material has issued from governmental and non-governmental 
sources vitally interested in the allocations problem. It occurred to the 
writer that it might be useful to try to draw together some of this ma-
terial into a perspective which might put some of the familiar facts into 
new relationships. 
Much of the writing on the UHF-VHF allocations problem has suf-
fered under certain limitations. A great portion oi· the material available 
to the communications student interested in the allocations problem has ap-
peared in magazines, or in publications of the Senate Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce. The material in magazine form has taken one 
side or another, rarely giving a balanced picture of a complicated issue. 
l'luch of the Senate material has been accessible only to the curious or the 
hardy. Even writers like Sidney Head, who has provided stuaents of broad-
casting with a thoughtful and penetrating analysis of the industry, none-
theless have dismissed UHJ<' owners' problems with the thought that 11 UHF 
stations as a group lost fortunes instead of making them ••• chiefly owing to 
miscalculation of risks, inept management, and poor local programming. 111 
Little attempt was made to analyze the factors which contributed to one or 
all of the conclusions. The same has held true of those who have made 
1sidney w. 
Company, 1956), P• 
Head, Broadcasting in America (Boston: Houghton l~fflin 
167. 
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charges against the industry itself, the Federal Co!lli~unications Commission, 
and the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Conunerce. 
The material for this thesis was taken largely from reports and 
hearings of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Conunerce, reports 
of the Federal Communications Commission, and other governmental sources. 
As the bibliography will indicate, however, material also was drawn from 
non-governmental sources and used within this thesis. 
In reading the material, and in weighing the pros and cons of the 
allocations question, the questions which presented themselves to the writer 
; were these: (l) did UHF stations fail because their owners began broad-
casting without proper knowledge of UHF's capabilities; (2) were UHF 
1- owners led on by the "promise" of the Federal Communications Commission 
' 
'; 
; that because they were pioneering in a new field they would receive special 
: consideration from the Commission for their broadcasting efforts; and (3) 
i did the networks, and the industry as a whole, deliberately try to scuttle 
! the UHF issue with a "let them swim or sink" policy? 
The thesis which follows is an attempt to answer these questions. 
-ts conclusions are, inescapably, inaaequate. It is no more than a brief 
;review oi' a rather extensive body of material on the allocations problem in 
!!relation to the economic, social, and political implications of the issue. 
';But, as such, the thesis may be of interest to other students of broadcast-
.:ing who may choose to delve deeper into the problems of a dynamic industry 
:! 
i' 
'
1
:which has, in such a short span of time, had a profound effect on our 
!'lives. 
The writer's thanks go to Dr. David R. Mackey and to Dr. Jerry B. 
liBriscoe who in one way or another had a hand in this thesis. The writer 
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is especially indebted to Dr. Mackey who painstakingly reviewed and cor-
rected each draft of the thesis and who, during the course of its writing, 
made many invaluable suggestions. 
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lliTRODUCTION 
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM 
Television and the 
Federal Radio Commission 
The 11problem11 of allocating television channels was not one which 
began with the issuance of the Federal Communications Commission's Sixth 
Report and Order in 1952. It was in 1928 that the Federal Radio Commis-
sion1--predecessor of the F~C--noted that great advances had been made in 
2 
"radio television" which threatened to create serious problems. 
The Feder~l Radio Commission had permitted a few broadcasting 
stations to experliaent on their regularly assigned raCio frequencies on 
condition that telE;vision would be limited to a few hours of broadcasting 
per day and woula rtot interfere with adjacent frequencies) Additionally, 
some stations had r·equested permission to experiment with frequencies 
above the regular broadcast band; that is, the high frequency band above 
1,500 kilocycles. In noting these advances, the Commission stated that it 
had been urged to permit regular television service because there already 
was a large potential audience. The petition, however, was rejected by 
lThe five member Federal Radio Commission had been created by 
Congress with the passage of the Radio Act of 1927. In 1934, Congress 
passed the Communications Act which brought into being the seven-member 
Federal Communications Commission. 
2u.s. Federal Radio Commission, Second Annual Report of the Feder§! 
Radio Commission to the Con ress of the United States, For the Year Boded 
June , 19 , Together with a Supplemental Report for the Period front July 
1, 1928 to September 30, 1928 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928), 
I P• 21. 
3Ibid., pp. 21, 32, 252-257. 
:: 
1 
2 
the Commission because television woula "subject the broadcast listener to 
objectionable noises,nl 
In 1929, the Federal Radio Commission issued General Order 5o, 
' which allowed both television and facsimile experimental stations to oper-
ate between 2,000 and 2,200 kilocycles and 2, 750-2,950 kilocycles, 2 Such 
,, 
broadcasting was l:Lmi ted to the hours between one and six a.m. Two rules 
of priority in grru1ting applications were as follows: one, those engaged 
in experimental work to improve the technique of visual broadcasting; and 
two, those who used methods to give the maximum definition in picture with 
the minimum use of radio frequency band-widths, 
The Commission's wait-and-see policy regarding television, as well 
as its refusal to give in to pressure which woula release television to 
public viewing, had definite results within the first three years of the 
Commission's operation, In 1931, the Commission once more reported on its 
progress to Congress, making note of the fact that there had been much 
public interest shmm in what was termed "visual broadcasting. ,3 Such 
interest, the Commission believed, had stimulated the radio industry's 
laboratories toward increased efforts to improve the quality of picture, 
as well as to experiment in the use of pick-up devices for the production 
1Ibid., P• 22, 
2u.s. Federal Radio Commission, Third Annual Report of the Federal 
Radio Commission to the Con ress of the United States, Covering the Period 
rom October 1, 1 2, to November 1, 1929 Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1929), p. 22, 
3u.s, Federal Radio Commission, Fifth Annual R~ort of the Federal 
Radio Commission to the Con ress of the united States, or the Fiscai Year 
931 Washington: Gc>vernment Printing Office, 1931 , pp. 53-54. 
:; 
3 
of drama. 
Between 1925 and 1931, the inaustry had been limited in its use of 
frequencies for television, but despite the limitation had managed to 
manufacture equipment which would produce a television picture consisting 
of sixty lines per frame and twenty frames per secona.1 The Commission 
believed that even greater detail would be possible were the bana-•~aths 
wider. But the Commission stated that wider band-widths could not be made 
available in the low frequency portions of the spectrum without disrupting 
•other essential services," presumably such services as police, fire, 
emergency, ana government. The Commission therefore authorized a number 
of laboratories to investigate the possibilities of using the following 
frequencies for visual broadcasting: 43,000 to 46,000 kilocycles; 48,500 
to 50,300; and 60,000 to Bo,ooo kilocycles. In making these authorizations 
the Commission stated, "Preliminary reports indicate that these very high 
frequencies show great possibilities, and many transmissions are now being 
observed. It is, however, too early to form an opinion as to the suitabi-
lity of these bands.•2 
Television and the Federal 
Communications Commission 
On July 1, 1941, the Federal Connnunications Commission finally 
approved the connnercial operation of television broadcasting. Eighteen 
channels, each six megacycles wide, were assigned for this service, ex-
tending from 50 to 294 megacycles. 3 i-ii th the Commission 1 s inauguration 
1~, P• 54. 2Ibid., P• 54. 
3The radio and television spectrum as presently allocated by the 
FCC extends from 10 kilocycles to 30,000 megacycles. The spectrum is di-
vided into various bands, of which the two ~~ortant to this thesis are in 
the very high frequency band (VHF), which extends from 30 to 300 megacycles; 
and ultra hio:h frequency (UHF), which ~exte11dsfrom 300 to 3,000 megacycles. " 
li 
4 
of television, two stations began operation in New York City.l One oi' the 
stations was owned and operated by the National Broadcasting Company; the 
other, by the Columbia Broadcasti~g System. The National Broaacasting 
Company's 1\lJffiT (now viRCA) went on the air with a schedule of approximately 
sixty-five programs per rnonth. 2 In that year, the National Broadcasting 
1 Company realized less than $71 000 from "co~~ercial 11 television, but the 
company estimated that it had spent over two million collars by that tirne.3 
lu.s. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
. Network Broadcasting, House Report No. 1297, Pursuant to Section 136 of the 
: Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law 601, 79th Congress, and 
House Resolution 99 1 85th Congress; 85th Gong., 2d Sess. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 18. This report--commonly called the 
"Barrow Report" for its chairman, Dean Roscoe 1. Barrow of the University 
of Cincinnati Law School--rdll be cited hereafter as Network Broadcasting 
(1958), H. Report No. 1297. 
2u • .s. Songress, Senate, Television Inquiry, Hearings Before the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, u.s. Senate, 84th Gong. 2d Sess., 
·Pursuant to s. Res. 13 and 163, Including Testimony on s. 825, FebrU£ry-July, 
1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956). The hearings were 
printed in five parts, the fifth part being a continuation of the hearings 
during the 85th Gong., 1st Sess.: 
I, 
I• 
I' 
,' 
Part I. UHF-V'dF Allocation Problem: Testimony of the Federal 
Communications Commission. Cited hereafter as Television Inquiry 
(1956), Part l, Testimony of FCC. 
Part II. UHF-VHF Allocations Problem: Test~mony of Public and 
Industry Witnesses. Cited hereafter as Television Inquiry (1956), Part 
II, Testimony of Public ana Industry Witnesses. 
Part III. Subscription Television. Cited hereafter as Tele-
vision Inquiry (l956), Part III, Subscription Television. 
Part rrf. Network Practices. Cited hereafter as Television 
Inquiry (1956), Part IV, Network Practices. 
Part v. Allocations - Testimony of FCC; Additional Supplement 
on Network Practices. Cited hereai'ter as Television Inquiry (1957), 
Part V, Allocations - Testimony of FCC. This portion of the hearings 
was held pursuant to S. Res. 13 and s. Res. 163, 84th Gong., and S. Res~ 
26, 85th Gong., March 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1957). 
The above reference was taken from Television Inquiry (1956), Part IV, 
Network Practices, pp. 2282-2283. 
3Ibid., P• 2283. 
:o 
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On December 7, 1941, the United States entered World War II, and 
television broadcasting on a wide-scale basis was held in abeyance, 
Throughout the war, however, the Federal Communications Commission was 
concerned about frequency allocations and systems standaras, In 1942, the 
Commission suggested that the radio industry form a group which might study 
the problems related to the post-war expansion which the Commission antici-
'· pated, In 1943, the Radio Manufacturers Association and the Institute of 
Radio Engineers established the Radio Technical Planning Board, which sup-
plied the Federal Communications Commission with information and studies 
on allocations standards, 1 
As of September 1944, six commercial television stations were oper-
ating on a four-hour-per-week schedule. There were approximately 7,000 
receivers in use, and these were tuned to stations operating on frequencies 
below 90 kilocycles, In 1944, the Federal Communications Commission in-
vestigated the needs of non-governmental services for frequencies from 10 
kilocycles to 30 million kilocycles, The Commission found that the demand 
1
, for frequencies far exceeded the availability, The Commission therefore 
concluded that it had either to allocate fewer or narrower channels or 
assign television service to a different portion o1' the spectrum, 
There were differences of opinion within the industry regarding 
television's place in the spectrum. The Columbia Broadcasting System, 
'Cowles Broadcasting Company, and Zenith Radio Corporation believed that 
:.i the best place for television was in the UHF' portion of the spectrum. They 
L contended that color and high-fidelity monochrome television using a wider 
il 1\------------------------
lNetwork Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297, p. 18. The 
i!material in the paragraphs below was taken from the source and page cited. 
I 
i 
u ;: 
,: 
1: 
6 
= 
channel was possible within one or two years. The opposing group con-
sisted of such organizations as Philco, the Radio Corporation of America, 
DuMont, and the television panel of the Radio Technical Planning Board. 
This group believed that color transmission was still in the laboratory 
stage; that too little was known about the technical aspects of UHF; that 
excellent monochrome service was possible in a six megacycle channel; and 
that it might take years before a UHF system could be established. 
Having considered these views, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion decided to proceed in the VHF portion of the spectrum, but agreed 
that both color and high-fidelity monochrome television one day would have 
to be shifted entirely into the UHF portion oi" the spectrum.1 In May, 1945, 
the Commission announced that it could make only thirteen channels avail-
able and that ten of these would have to be shared by commercial television 
with non-governmental fixed and mobile services. 2 
World War II ended in August 1945. Between 194' and 194'/, the 
Federal Communications Commission continued to press for rules, regula-
tions, ana standards of good engineering practice for television. In 
September 1945, the Commission proposed a plan for the assignment of 
thirteen television channels among 140 cities.3 The assignment plan called 
for stations in small communities as well as large metropolitan areas. In 
1Ibid,, PP• 18-19. 
2Report, FCC Docket No. 6651 (May 25, 1945). See also "Rules 
'I Governing Television Broadcast Stations," Sec. 3.604, adopted by the FCC, 
:, November 28, 1945; in Federal Register, XI (January 1, 1946), P• .34. 
3Network Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297, P• 19 • 
• 
7 
the Commission's plan, New York city was to have been given four television 
assignments. 
During the hearings held between May and November 1945 on the 
Commission's plan, the Television Broadcasters Association1 presented an 
alternative assignment plan based on the following recommendations: 
(a) Use of directional antennas to increase the number 
of assignments to larger centers. 
(b) Reduction of cochannel ana adjacent channel minimum 
spacings to 85 and 55 miles. 
(c) Lowering maximum power below SO kilowatts. 
(d) Providing for substantially uniform maximum power 
for all stations. 2 
(e) Increasing the New York City assignments to seven. 
The question of' using the lJRF portion of the spectrum also came up 
during the hearings. DuMont, supported by the National Broadcasting 
Company, contended that the industry needed assurance that allocations 
would remain in the VHF portion of the spectrum f'or at least a decade and 
woula not be eliminated at the first commercial success of UHF. 3 The 
Columbia Broaacasting System and the American Broadcasting Company, however, 
were against extended operation in the VHF band. The American Broadcasting 
Company proposed that television be shifted to UHF at the end of a two-year 
period; that licensees of television stations be required to develop UHF 
under the Commission's guidance; that the public be given adequate notice 
of any change-over in service; and that the industry promise a liberal 
trade-in allowance on 1J1lF' sets when transition to UHl' took place. 4 
lTBA, formed in 1944, consisted of a cross-section of the commu-
nications industry. It included advertising and motion pict'lre firms, 
networks, electronics manufacturing concerns, ana even educational insti-
tutions. 
2Network Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 12517, P• 19. 
)Ibid., P• 20. 4Ibid., P• 20. 
8 
Having once again weighed the problem, the Commission decideu, in 
November 1945, to make all channels except channel one available for either 
metropolitan or small community stations. The Commission also added assign-
ments by the closer spacing of stations and permitting New York City and 
northeastern New Jersey a total of seven assignments.1 The Commission, 
however, rejected the Television Broadcasters Association's recommendations 
for use of directional antennas. It also lowered the power and limited 
the coverage of small community stations. 
The split in the industry's thoughts on television was not healed, 
however, by the Commission's 1945 decision. The controversial question of 
UHF v. VHF and whether television would develop in monochrome or color 
continued to plague the industry and the Commission. In 1946, the Columbia 
Broadcasting System, again backed by Cowles and Zenith, proposed its own 
color operation for Commission approval. 2 The plan involved use of UHF 
channels. The Radio Corporation of America, l!ut"lont, the Television Broad-
casters Association, ana other segments of the industry opposed Columbia's 
color system on the gro-unds that it was incompatible with the black-and-
'white system and was limited in terms of brightness, freedom from flicker, 
and fidelity.3 The Radio Corporation of America believed that a compatible 
'system was possible. 
Other engineers favored the Columbia color proposal. T.A.N. Craven 
lReport, FCC Docket No. 6780 (November 21, 1945). See aJ.so "Rules 
Governing Television Broadcast Stations," Sec. 3.606, adopted by the FCC, 
November 28, 1945; in Federal Register, XI (January 1, 1946), PP• 34-35. 
2Network Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297, P• 20. 
3Ibid., P• 20. 
9 
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(formerly a Federal Communications Commissioner, but at that time a con-
sulting raoio engineer) testified in the proceedings that the "allocation 
of TV channels in the spectrum snoulci consist oi· a continuous band of 
frequencies above 100 megacycles,• ana he indicated that it "might be 
necessary for such an allocation to commence in the UHF portion of the 
spectrum.nl The Commission was concerned by the fact that Columbia's 
proposal involved UHF channels sixteen megacycles wide, which would limit 
UHF to only twenty-seven channels. Primarily on the basis of this UHF 
limitation, the Commission rejected the Columbia proposal. 2 
The rejection of the Columbia color system apparently resolved the 
doubts of VHF proponents. During 1947, the number of television stations 
increased from six to twelve, sixty construction permits were outstanding, 
and nine applications were pending. 3 In May 1948, the Commission deleted 
1 channel one and abolished all channel sharing.4 But it soon became appar-
!: 
'! ent that neither these actions nor the Commission's 1945 allocations plan 
1j 
:: had solved the problem. The channel spacings caused station interferences 
!j 
! as new stations began operation. Station interference was compounded by a 
1Television Inquiry (1957), Part V, Allocations - Testimony of 
FCC, P• 3185. 
2Network Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297, P• 21. 
3u.s. Federal Communications Commission, Thirteenth Annual Report, 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1947 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1947), pp. 22-23. Cited hereafter as FCC, Thirteenth Annual Report, 
1947. 
4u.s. Federal Communications Commission, "Sharing of Television 
Channels and Assignment of Frequencies to Television and Non-Governmental 
Fixed and Mobile Services," Report and Order, FCC Docket No. 8487 (May 5, 
1948), in Federal Register, XIII (May 14, 1948), PP• 2625-26~6. 
10 
phenomenon called "tropospheric interference.•l Channel spacings had to be 
reviewed, and the Commission called an engineering conference to consider 
revisions in its rules and standards. 2 
Pending the outcome of the conference, the Commission clamped a 
"freeze" on the processing of new applications for television stations. 
Previously authorized stations were permitted to proceed with construction, 
however. The Commission had thought that the freeze would last only six to 
nine months, but four years passed before the freeze was lifted on July 1, 
1952. By the time it had been lifted, 108 VHF stations were on the air, 
with more than eighteen million receivers in operation,3 
lu.s. Federal Communications Commission, Fifteenth Annual Report, 
Fiscal Year ~ded June 30, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office 
1950), PP• 42-43. Cited hereafter as FCC, Fifteenth Annual Report, 1949. 
2Ibid. 
3u .s. Federal Communications Commission, Eighteenth Annual Report, 
' Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1952 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1953), PP• 109, 123. Cited hereafter as FCC, Eighteenth Annual Report, 
1952. 
--~--=:-:::; ~~==·7=':::._· --·----
CHAPTER I 
THE ISSUES 
In April 1952, the Federal Communications Conunission issued its 
famed Sixth Report and Order which served to lift the freeze, The report 
announced the opening of eighty-two television channels: seventy UHF 
channels, in addition to the twelve vnF already in use, The report provided 
for 2,053 assignments of which 242 were given for the use of educational 
institutions in various communities of the nation. Of these, 1,319 com-
mercial and 169 educational assignments were in the UHF bana.1 With the 
report, the Commission intermixed UHF and VHF assignments in the same 
communities, although many representatives of the industry warned that the 
intermixture was unsound and would place ubF at a competitive disadvant-
age, 2 The Conunission assumed, however, that 11both VHF and UHF stations 
would be accepted by the public and [th~l industry on an equal or, at least, 
on a comparative basis,n3 As T.A.¥.. Craven noted, "This assumption was 
made in spite of the fact that technical development and knowledge of Uh~ 
television had not progressed beyond the initial stages,n4 
That hopes were high for UHF television was evident in a Business 
Week article in which it was noted that of 500 applications filed in 1952, 
lu.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, The Television Inquiry: Allocations Phase, Sen, Report No. 2769, 
Pursuant to s. Res. 13 and S, Res, 163, 84th Gong., 2d Sess. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 2. Cited hereafter as Television 
Inquiry: Allocations Phase, Sen. Report No. 2769. 
2Ibid, 
3Television Inquiry (1957), Part V, Allocations - Testimony of FCC, 
P• 3193. 
11 
12 
shortly ai'ter the report, 200 were for UHF. The article went on to state, 
"Some experts in the field explain that, in spite of the skepticism about 
the new band, telecasters are so eager to get the jump on competitors 
that they choose the easier-to-get UHF. Others claim that ultra high 
frequency is where the future of the industry lies: There's less inter-
ference, fewer ghosts, more room•l 
However, the hopes for UHF television were not fulfilled in the 
years following the report. Up until July 1956, construction permits for 
363 UHF stations had been granted. Of these, only 151 went on the air, 
and of these fifty-six suffered such losses that they suspended operation. 
The holders of 111 permits relinquished them without ever going on the 
air, while 101 permits were being held in suspense. 2 In March 1956, 
Federal Communications Commission Chairman George C. McConnaughey re-
ported that the largest number of UHF stations ever on the air at the 
same time had been 121 in 1953; and as of March 1957, there were ninety 
UHF stations broadcasting as compared with ninety-one in 1956, when two 
went off the air and one came on. Furthermore, out of a total of forty 
million television sets, eight million were UHF, of which only three and 
nine-tenths million were actually in use for UHF.3 Perhaps the best pic-
ture of the rise and decline of UHF stations can be seen in the following 
table. 
lnultra High Frequency: Promised Land of TV?" Business Week 
{August 9, 1952), PP• 42-43. 
2Television Inquiry: Allocations Phase (195b) 1 s. Report No. 
2769, P• '3. 
3Television Inquiry (1957) 1 Part V, Allocations - Testimony of 
FCC, p. 3165. Although McConnaughey reported 121 stations for 19531 it is 
submitted that he actually meant. not 1953. but 1954. 
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TABLE 1 
COMMERCIAL TEL1~ISION STATIONS AUTHORIZED AND ON TH~ AIR 1952-1957 
As of July 1 Authorized On the Air 
VHF UHF VHF UHF 
1952 •••.•••••.••.•... .•......•••....•• 108 ... 108 • •• 
195 3 ••••••••••••••••••••••••••....•••• 247 240 152 45 
1954 •.. .•.•...........•............... 334 236 256 124 
1955 •.•............. .................. 370 209 317 104 
1956 •. .••••..•......•.•..•...•........ 407 201 363 94 
1957 •.•••.••••. ..•...•..•..•.......... 442 207 389 86 
Source: Network Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 12971 p. 31. 
Huch of what has been lil'itten on the subject of the UHF problem 
has involved claims and counter claims in attempts to attach the blame on 
one group or another for the failure of UHF broadcasting to develop as had 
VHF. Much criticism has been attached to the actions of the Federal Com-
munications Commission. One authority, Leo Bogart, referred to the fact 
that the problem of UHF was side-stepped in order to place emphasis on the 
number of stations which might be supported by markets of specified size,1 
this reasoning referring to the allocations system which arbitrarily made 
specific frequencies available to certain numbers of cities ana towns. 
Another authority, Sidney llead, dismissed UHF owners' problems with the 
thought that UH.F owners had miscalculated the risks. 2 
1Leo Bogart, The Age of Television (New York: Frederick Unger 
Press, 1956), P• 291. 
2' ... :;;upra, P• J.J.J.. 
-.:l. 
Another critic, Hazel Cooley,1 placed the blame on the Senate 
Sub-committee for Communications and Federal Communications Commission. 
She did not believe that the issue was that VHF owners were the smarter 
operators. She did believe that, owing to the interpretation and the 
enforcement of Commission rules, lfriF stations could not possibly survive. 
Without legislation, UHF' was doomed to control by "a few privileged owners." 
She cited--although she did not name--one city in which a UI-IF station had 
been operating with a weak signal. Before it could boost its power, the 
Federal Communications Commission hac authorized a VHF station for the 
city. She did not offer ev:idence, however, the.t the UHF station had failed 
as a result of the Federal Communications Commission's move. In another 
issue of the same magazine, an editoria12 dealt with the denial of a 
charmel to the Madison, Wisconsin, Capital-Times on the ground that the 
company owned the city 1 s only other newspaper and radio station. The 
Commission had permitted another large interest to have the channel, ana 
the editorial asked why independent monopolies should not be granted 
licenses to operate stations against Republican-controlled monopolies, 
In other articles, blame for UHF owners' problems had been attri-
buted to network power interests, as well as to the Federal Communications 
Commission. Anne Langman, 3 for exruuple, remarked that networks have done 
a great deal of good, but she questioned the monopoly of networks which 
lHazel Cooley, "Monopoly in TV; Stifling the UHF Bands," Nation 
(February 191 1955), PP• 159-161. 
2n!>!onopoly: A New Concept,• Nation (February 4, 1956), PP• 81-82. 
3Anne 1-1. Langman, "Television: Government Regulation, 11 Nation 
(August 11, 1956), PP• 126-127. 
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resulted in stifling independent producers ana stations. She also cited 
the "bunglings" of the Commission as "masterpieces of inaction" as applied 
to the Commission's 1956 interim aeintermixture plan. She pointed out 
that, while the plan supposedly proposed to end the operation of iJEF' and 
VHF in the same conununities, it was in fact applied only to two: Fresno, 
California, and l1adison, Wisconsin. Business rJeek1 referred to the tele-
vision industry's woes in being investigated by the Senate Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee, the Communications Committee, the House Judi-
ciary Anti-Trust Committee headed by Emanuel Geller, ana the Justice De-
partment--the root of the investigations being the UHF allocations problem, 
co~licated by the rights of sponsors to select other than network stations 
in placing their advertisements and sponsored programs. 
And to what specific reasons have those in the industry ana other 
critics attributed the failure of so many lfnF stations? The answers have 
been legion but usually have boiled down to four factors: (l) low power, 
(2) signal strength, (3) receivers, ana (4) audience. These four factors, 
aithough easily isolated on paper, were not rnutuaily exclusive. 
One means the Federal Communications Commission used to equaljze 
UHF and VBF was to set ceiling limits on tower heights. For the northeast, 
north central, ana south central states (Zone I), maximum tower heights were 
set at 1,000 feet for VHF; for Ut~ in those areas, 2,000 feet. All other 
zones (Zones II and III) were permitted to have two-thousand foot towers 
both for UHF' and v1lF. Allen B. DuMont had this to say about the ~ortance 
l"Lining Up for TV's Big Battle, n Business Week (March 10, 1956), 
PP• ob-67, 70-74. 
16 
of height in transmission: 
One very important factor to keep in mind in finding a 
location for your station is that height is extremely important 
in giving you coverage. In other words, generally speaking,it 
is cheaper to go up several hundred feet with your antenna mast 
than it is to increase greatly the power of the transnutter. 
If you take a look throughout the country, you will find several 
locations where use has been made of that with very excellent 
results. One of me best examples, of course, of using a natural 
site is the situation in Los Angeles, where all of the transmit-
ters are located on top oi' Mt. Wilson, which is about 5,000 feet 
over the average terrain. Whereas the coverage from a trans-
mitter w-lth a 500-foot antenna might be 35 to 40 miles, the cover-
age from those particular transmitters is closer to 125 or 150 
miles, and they receive the pictures down in San Diego and even 
further south. 'rherefore, if you can take advantage of a natural 
hill or mountain, you can greatly extend your coverage.l 
It is interesting to note tnat the transmitters to which Dul1ont 
referred were VHF'. There have been factors other than height, however, 
which have affected UHF stations. One has been power. The signal, or 
energy, radiated from an antenna may take several paths, depending on the 
frequency transmitted. Eost of the energy transmitted from an antenna 
will go out horizontally, although some of the energy may streak toward 
the sky. Low frequencies have tended to hug the ground, following the 
curvature of the earth, when transmitted. Higher frequencies have tended 
to scatter more energy skyward. 
Therefore, a television station assigned to VHF channel two would 
operate on a frequency bane lower than -v.iF channel 13. The signal radiated 
from the channel two station's antenna would tend to hug the ground and 
offer better area-coverage than a signal transmitted from channel thirteen's 
antenna. UHF stations, operating on frequencies higher than VHF, would 
lAllen B. Dm~ont, "~ducational Television," in A Television Policy 
for Education, ed. Carroll v. Newsom (Washington: American Council on 
Education, 1952), PP• 22-23. 
-::;,_,_ -
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have a coverage area smaller than either channel two or thirteen's. In 
point of fact, a UHF station's broadcast area has been approximately forty 
miles as compared with the VHF's sixty-mile radius. 
One way found to compensate for the differences in radiated energy 
among the various types of stations has been to raise or lower the power of 
the transmitting stations. The Federal Communications Commission limited 
the maximum power of VHF low channels 2-6 to 100 kilowatts; channels 7-13, 
to 316 kilowatts; and UHF channels 14-83, to 1,000 kilowatts.1 To produce 
a signal strength equal to that of a VHF station, a UHF station must gen-
erate more power than normally required by VHF. The truth of the matter 
was, however, that up until 1956 ill1F stations were operating at approxi-
mately one-quarter maximum allowable power2 simply because transmitters 
capable of full power were not available. The root of the trouble lay in 
producing a stable power tube capable of transmitting at high frequencies 
and at the greater power required for such transmission,3 
Still another factor gave UHF stations trouble. UHF also has been 
subject to signal interference from landscape. That is, the more rugged 
the terrain, the greater the probability that there will be "white" areas 
in which there will be poor, or little reception from a Ulll' station no 
matter how great the power or how high the antenna. 
lFcc, Eighteenth Annual Report, 1952, p. 110. 
2one exception was w~RE-TV, Wilkes Barre, Pa, See Television 
Inqui!f. (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and Industry Witnesses, 
P• 68 • 
~arl B. Abrams, "Answers Are Coming to UHF's Problems, 11 Broad-
casting-Telecasting (March 22, 1954), pp. 66, 68. 
ll !: 
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One cannot state that one handicap has been more serious than 
another in the case of UHF. But many have agreed that the receiver problem 
has been perhaps the most serious one the UHF station owners have had to 
face, since without receivers there could be no audience. The problem of 
receivers stemmed from the fact that VHF-only sets came on the scene much 
earlier than UHF. In those areas where UHF and VHF stations were available 
to an audience, and where that audience had VHF receivers, the UHF' signal 
could not be received by a VHF set without a converter. Such a converter 
would cost, according to Sarkes Tarzian, manufacturer of tuning components 
for television receivers, from twenty to twenty-five dollars.l Regarding 
all-channel receivers, Tarzian stated that the "inadequate performance and 
higher price--$.30 to $50 more to the people--of earlier VHF-Uill' receivers" 
hindered the growth of UHF broadcasting. 2 Added to these difficulties was 
the unfamiliarity of many television servicemen with proper UHF antenna 
installation.3 
In order to stimulate interest in UH:F' receivers, the UHF stations 
themselves often expended thousands of dollars in advertising campaigns. 
UHF station WGBS-TV, Miami, Florida, for example, spent $23,000 in one 
month alone to promote UHF,4 But set conversion remained low in many 
areas. Advertisers, perceiving that UH}' stations could not in many cases 
lTelevision Inqui~ (1956), Part II, Testimony of Pub~ic and 
industry Witnesses, p.~2~ 
2Ibid. 
3Earl B. Abrams, "Are UHF Receivers as Good as VHF?" Sroadcasting-
Telecasting (November 2, 1953), PP• 82-83. 
4Television Inquir~ (1956), 
Industry Witnesses, PP• .30 , 325. 
Part II, Testimony of Public and 
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provide the coverage that a VHF station could, shunneci. UHF. Networks, 
faced with an affiliation with a VHF or UHF station, chose the former over 
the latter ana sometimes even switched affiliation when a VHF station be-
gan its operation in what had been a UHF market. 1 
1Ibid., P• '/93. 
CHAPTER II 
CASE HISTORIES OF UHF STATIONS 
Perhaps the classic example of a UHF station failure was that of 
WROV-TV, Roanoke, Virginia.1 Roanoke had been authorizea two VHF channels 
for which there had been five applicants in 1952. The owners of WROV-TV 
had been one of the five applicants. Eager to get into operation, however, 
t~ey withdrew their application for a VHF channel. Instead, they submitted 
an application for a UHF channel, which was granted to them. Had the 
owners of WROV-TV been able to obtain prompt delivery of the one kilowatt 
RCA transmitter they had ordered, theirs would have been the first televi-
sian station to go into operation in Roanoke. But, while they waited for 
delivery of the transmitter, one of the two VHF channels was granted to the 
Shenandoah Life Insurance Company. The latter's VHF station (WSLS) began 
its operation before WROV-TV. 
Roanoke lies in a mountainous area. WSLS, the VJ:iF' station, placed 
its tower on top of a mountain high above Roanoke itself. In December 
1952, WSLS began broadcasting with a two kilowatt RCA transmitter ana a hig~ 
gain antenna which radiated 26.2 KW. In July 1953, the VHF station's signal 
showed regular response from such cities as Bristol, 125 miles away; 
R.ichmond, 140 miles; and Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 90 miles away. 
TI1e set count claimed by WSLS in July 1953 was 87,000. The station's total 
market claim was 396,000 families, or one and one half million pet·sons. 
lJ. Frank Beatty, '"Nhat Happened in Roanoke?" Broadcasting-
Telecasting (July 13, 1953), pp. 115-118. The account below was taken 
from the article cited. 
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The station was affiliated with the Uationa.t Broadcasting Company and the 
Columbia Broadcastj_ng System. Its national card rate was ~!300 as compared 
with w1lOV-TV 1 s national rate of ~200. 
WROV-TV, when it finally went into operation in March 1953, 
placed its tower- on a mountain lower than that on which WSL::i had placed 
its tower. Although WROV-l'V' s antenna put out a claimed signal. of lb KW, 
the Feaeral Conununications Commission rated the station's signal at only 
9. 7 KW. One portion of the radiated signaL reached a mountain twelve 
miles away but did not go over the 4,000 foot mountain. In fact, WROV-TV's 
coverage was confined to the bowl of the valley in which Roanoke lies and 
covered Roanoke proper with its population of 91,000 persons, or 28,000 
homes. From Jc!arch to July 1953, WROV-TV could claim a 70 per cent set 
conversion to UHF, reaching only 19,000 homes in the whole of Roanoke 
County. ~~OV-TV, and American Broadcasting Company affiliate, took in 
$15,569 during the first three months of operation. Projected on a yearly 
basis, the station's income would have been $62,2/6 with expenses of 
lJil08,180, making a total loss of $45,896. The only hope the station had 
for continued survival was that the Radio Corporation of America could 
build a more high-powered transmitter before tr,e 1954 or 1955 date anti-
cipated by that company. The station failed. 
On the surface, the failure of viROV-TV might be considered a 
failure of UHF itself to operate in rugged terrain. But there were other 
factors implicit in the WROV-TV story. One of these was the fact that 
WROV-TV had been affiliated with the American Broa.acasting Company, a 
network whose programming at that time was not so strong as its competi-
tors'. How~ver, if one could envisage a UID station whose management we.s 
:! 
" 
" 
l: 
22 
wise in the ways of broadcasting and in the engineering of a UHf station, 
.:>nd if one could assume that such a station began its operation in rugged 
terr-ain, without cor.;peti tors, how woula such a station fare? 
1 buch a station was KFTV, Portland, Oregon. Owned and operated by 
the Storer Broadcasting Company, a multiple-station organization owning 
raaio and television stations throughout the country, KPTV coulc. make the 
claim that it had been the first commercial UEF station to begin its oper-
ation in the .United States. It was one which broadcast successfully for 
almost five years. 
KPT'Il began its operations in September 1952 in a city which die. not 
have its own television station but received signals from Seattle, Washing-
ton. Its original trensmitting equirment was the KC2XAX which had been 
used in Bridgeport, Cocnecticut, to provide the inaustry ana the government 
with UHF propagation information. KPTV telecast a signal rated at 1'7 .6 K\·1, 
originally driven by a one kilowatt transmitter, the KC2XAX. Portland lies 
in a valley flanked by mountains, with a high hill or plateau in the middle 
of the city. The station's antenna was mounted on a 250-foot tower, which 
was plBced on the plateau 1,050 feet above Portland's business district. 
The signal radiated covered an area forty miles or better. 
It was estimated in 1953 that KFTV had achieved 26 per cent set 
saturation, or 87,000 homes, in an area in which there were 310,000 
families consisting of 9.50,000 persons. The total outlay in tr&nsmitter, 
tower, building, office builaing improvements, remote tz·uck, new stuaios, 
lJ. Frank Beatty, "The Port.lana Story," Broadcasting-Telecasting, 
XLV (September 28, 19.53), PP• 110-112, 114. The following material was 
taken from the article cited. 
" 
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new transmitter, and a new tower ran to $727,000. Broadcasting-Telecasting 
estimated KPTV 1 s annual volume of business at that time to be approximately 
a half-million dollars. KPTV, a National Broadcasting Company affiliate, 
only admitted to being in the black. The station started with a $250 
basic hourly rate, but in February 1953 the rate was raised to $350 per 
hour. Its con~etitor, VliF station KOIN-TV--which began operation as a 
Columbia Broadcasting System affiliate in 1954--started with a iiiSOO basic 
hourly rate. 
This would have been an outstanding success story were it not for 
the fact that in 1956 George B. Storer appeared before the Senate Committee 
on Inter·state and Foreign Commerce and sta.ted that, while on the surface 
the Portland station had done very well, much money had been poured back 
into the station in order to improve its facilities.1 In the face of such 
losses, he doubted that the Storer Company could continue its uEF opera-
tion in Portland. KPTV was sold to a VHF competitor in April 1957, making 
Portland, Oregon, an all-VHF market, with a total of three stations in 
operation. 2 
KPTV was a UHF station which had many of the elements for con-
tinued success: a prime network affiliation, the first in its market, money 
1Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and 
Industry Witnesses, P• 320. 
2Te1evision Factbook, XIII, Fall-Winter, 1957, p. 197. 
:: 
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with which to expand its facilities, good management, and a good market.1 
Despite all these elements, the management found that the UHF' station 
couJ.d not compete on terms with VHF. .An indication of KPTV• s major diffi-
culty was expressed by Storer during his testimony before the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1956. Storer brought out the 
fact that KPTV had requested permission from the Federal Communication 
Commission to build and operate a "satellite" station which would enable 
KPTV to fill in shadow areas in which KPTV•s signal was not being received. 
Such a station would use power, he estimated, on the order of 200,000 
watts. 2 1n his own words he said: 
vle are preparing an application to the Federal Communications 
Commission requesting permission to construct such a satellite on 
an experimental basis, but carrying the reguJ.ar programs of KPTV. 
In connection with that application, we will request, if necessary, 
!Although Storer intimated that the enormous amounts of money sunk 
! into KPTV and the possible incursion of VHF might cause suspension of UHF 
broadcasting in the Portland area, there may have been other factors at 
work in this case. One does not sell a station in less than a year unless 
one has been thinking at considerable length about such a sale. Addition-
ally, it might be pointed out that the Storer Company had been undergoing 
FCC and u.s. Court proceedings regarding its multiple station interests. 
' In Storer Broadcastin Co an v. United States and Federal Communications 
Commission, No. 1 ,o ecide February 2 , 19 , the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia invalidated that part of the FCC 1 e multiple 
ownership rule providing maximum limitation on the number of broadcast 
stations in which any person may have an interest. The FCC, however, 
carried the case to the Supreme Court. See U.S. Federal Communications 
Commission, Twenty-First Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1955 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1956), P• 22. See also U.~. Federal Communi-
cations Commission, Twenty-Second Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1956 (Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 20. The judgment of the 
1 
appeals court was reversed and the case remanded to consider Storer's 
' other objections to tne multiple ownership rules. Preceding FCC reports 
1: cited hereafter as FCC, Twenty-First Annual Report, 1955; and FCC, Twenty-
Second Annual Heport, 1956. 
2Television Inquiry (1956), 
I, Industry Witnesses, PP• 310-.311. 
I' 
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that the Commission waive or suspend its multiple ownership and 
overlap rules. We believe that this experiment holds great 
promise of providing a realistic solution to the UHF coverage 
problem in many areas. This experiment will cost our company 
about $15o,ooo.l 
If difficulties with UHF propagation characteristics worried KPTV, 
so did the thought that the station might lose its affiliation with the 
National Broadcasting Company when the second VHF station authorized in 
Portland began its operation. In his testimony during the 1956 television 
inquiry, Storer commended the network for having continued its affiliation 
with the Portland UHF station. He doubted that the station could have 
2 
,, afforded to remain on the air without the network's support. He went on 
to state that the network had indicated to him that it would continue its 
affiliation with KPTV ana assist in developing the station if the Commis-
sion granted KPTV permission to build the experimental satellite. 3 
Up until 1957, however, the Federal Communications Commission was 
proceeding with caution in the matter of satellites, boosters, and trans-
lators.4 The latter, the Commission observed, were proving to be of great 
2~., P• 316. 
, 4several technical terms were used during the 1956 Senate televi-
:: 
! sion inquiry hearings. The ideas they represented were advanced as possiblei 
solutions to the UHF propagation problem. See Television Inquiry (1957), 
i Part v, Allocations - Testimony of FCC, PP• 3349-3351, for a full explana-
, tion of the terms. 
In brief, however, the FCC defined them as follows: a booster is a 
facility which intercepts the signals of a TV station, amplifies them, and 
'!retransmits on the same channel on which they are received; a satellite, a 
:! TV station which duplicates entirely, or almost entirely, the program ser-
1' vice of another TV station, thus avoiding the cost of originating local 
,: programs; a translator, a TV station which intercepts the signals of an-
I! other TV station, amplifies them, and. retransmits on another channel dif-
1! ferent from that on which they were intercepted.. The so-called "satellite" 
!) station proposed by KPTV, however, would have been a cross between a satel-
r lite as defined by the FCC ana a translator station, inasmuch as ancther l, channel would have been requested. 
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value in sparsely populated areas, such as Coloraoo, where television 
service from a "mother" station could reach communities that could not 
otherwise afford to support a station.1 
In the two cases presented thus far, the technical difficulties 
inherent in DtiF propagation characteristics have been paramount in the 
failure of the stations to operate in rugged terrain. What of those cases 
of UHF' station failure when the stations have been operating in fairly 
level or rolling terrain? To what may their failure be attributed? Tes-
timony submitted before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee during the 19.56 hearings cited the feet that less than a month 
after Federal Coi'llllunications Commission testimony was given to show how a 
small station could survive by limited operation in the face of VHF com-
petition, the UHF station discontinued operation because it had suffered 
losses throughout its entire hiscory of operation. 2 
The same testimony revealed that in Wichita, Kansas, ~riF station 
KEDD-TY corunenced operation in August 19.53, at approximately the same time 
that a VIIF station began broadcasti..''lg in the same area.3 Within a year, 
there were 124,000 VrlF homes as compared with 74,000 url}· homes. Two other 
VHF stations then commenced operation in the market. KEDD-?J petitioned 
the Federal Communications Commission to deintermix the Wichita market by 
the assignment of another VHF channel, but the Commission refused the 
'··. FCC, 
1Television Inquiry (1957), Part V, Allocations- Testimony of 
PP· 3350-3351. 
2Television Inquiry (19.56), Part II, Testimony of Public ana 
Industry 1-iitnesses, P• 758. 
Jrbid,, PP• 7.58-759. 
" 
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the petition. In March 1956, KEDD-TV faced the loss of its National 
Broadcasting Company affiliation. In April 1956, the station discontinued · 
its operation. The testimony also revealed that the Tampa-St. Petersburg, 
Florida, UHF station (WSUN-TV) bad been on the air for two years. WSUN-TV 
had been making a profit before two VHF stations were given authority by 
the Commission to begin broadcasting. In March 1956, WSUN-TV' s overall 
time-sales showed a 42.5 per cent decrease.1 
Not only the preference of the public, evident in the preceding 
paragraphs, caused UHF stations trouble, but there was also the preference 
of the networks for VHF. One such example was the case of WTAO-TV, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 2 This was the case of a UHF station overshadowed 
by two VHF stations, each affiliated with one or two of the three major 
networks. At the time that Frank Lyman, Jr., president of the Middlesex 
Broadcasting Corporation, appeared before the Senate Committee in 1956, 
WTAO-TV had been in operation for two years without a network affiliation. 
The station had arranged for indirect service from the American Broadcast-
ing Co11pany; but the Worcester, Massachusetts, UHF station through which 
WTAO-TV would have been able to receive American Broadcasting Company pro-
grams on an off-the-air-pickup relay went out of business in the fall of 
1955. The Cambridge station then had to depend on film and local origina-
tions • .3 The statiOD was forced to suspend its operation in 1956. 
The Barrow Report cited the case of UHF station WIFE-TV, Dayton, 
1Ihid., P• 759. 
.3Ibid •• P• .366. 
2~., PP• .365-368 • 
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Ohio.1 The station began operation in a city in which two VHF stations 
had been broadcasting since 1949; consequently, the majority of receivers 
were VHF-only. The new UHF station not only had to convert its public to 
UHF receivers but also was faced with attempting to complete an affiliation 
!' with any one of the four networks: the 'fational Broadcasting Company, the 
! 
Columbia Broadcasting System, the American Broadcasting Company, or DuMont, 
' which was still in operation as a network at that time, 
Network programs were placed on the two Dayton VJW stations. 2 If 
clearance could not be obtained from the VEl, stations, the networks pre-
ferred to cover the area from Cincinnati rather than to utilize the UHF 
station in Dayton. WIFE-TV finally was able to conclude an agreement with 
the American Broadcasting Company by which the station paid ;11,000 per 
month for the network's sustaining programs. This die not, however, give 
WIFE-TV the right to claim the American Broadcasting Company's sponsored 
programs. The station, unable to broadcast popular programming, was forced 
to suspend its operation. 
There have been areas, however, in which UHF stations proved to be 
successful. Explicitly, they have proved to be successful, up until 1956 at 
least, in areas where (l) no other local service was available, (2) no VHF 
\: competition had to be met, and (3) UHF stations faced no more than one VHF 
competitor. One outstanding example was the Evansville, Indiana, area, 
Evansville had been one of the successful UHF markets in the country and 
had been one of the thirteen markets listed as "musts11 for Feaeral Communi-
lNetwork Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297, P• 222, 
I 
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cations Commission deintermixture action because of the very success of 
UHF' in the market. 
A strong case for deintermixture in the Evansville area was made 
during the 1956 Senate television hearings by Jesse D. Fine, president of 
~~ Premier Television, Incorporated, the operator of UHF station i'iFIE-TV ,1 
I' 1-iFIE-TV served the Evansville market. 
II 
UHF station 'WEET operated in Hen-
t: 
derson, Kentucky, some twelve to fifteen miles from Evansville. Both 
'WIE-TV and WHET served the Evansville area, Beyond the Evansville-
Henderson area, there was another ~HF station (WSIL), operating in Harris-
burg, Illinois, some fifty-five miles from Evansville, Indiana. There was 
also an application pending for a UHF station in Owensboro, Kentucky, some 
thirty miles from Evansville. 
Fine stated that in bringing television service to Evansville in 
1953, the owners of ~~IE-TV had invested $600,000 in equipment and facili-
ties.2 From the time the station began broadcasting in November 1953 
until September 1955, \\'FIE-TV had sustained operating losses approximating 
$100 1 000. The station had since been operating at a profit and had re-
couped a small part of its losses. Both 1-WIE-TV a.'1d WHET had managed to 
achieve a receiver total well over 100,000 in the Evansville-Henderson 
area. 'WFIE-TV enjoyed an affiliation with both the American Broadcasting 
Company and the National Broadcasting Company. w'HET was affiliated with 
· the Columbia Broadcasting :lystem. 
lTelevision Inquiry (1956), Part II, 1'estimony of Public and 
' Industry 'Witnesses, p.li96: 
v 
Fine pointed out to the Senate Committee that two UHF channels had 
been allocated to the Evansville area: VHF channel seven, allocated to 
Evansville proper; and VHF channel nine, allocated to Hatfield, Indiana, a 
village twenty miles east of Evansville.1 Wben in 1954 it became apparent 
to Premier Television that station WFIE-TV could not exist if two VHF 
stations came into the market, the owners petitioned the Commission to 
delete the VHF allocations and make the Evansville-Henderson area all-UHF. 
According to Fine, the Commission denied the petition, stating that the 
applicant for channel seven already had spent a great deal of money in the 
hearing for the channel. 
Between January and November 1955, Premier Television submitted a 
series of petitions to the Commission in a fight for deintermixture. 2 In 
December 1955, however, the Commission granted the application for channel 
seven in Evansville. The Commission stated, according to Fine, that 
Premier Television had been too late to participate in the channel seven 
matter. The Commission further stated that the channel seven grant had 
been made because the rules provided for channel seven to be allocated to 
Evansville but that, if in the future it was decided to delete channel 
seven from the Evansville area, the channel seven station could then be 
shifted to a UHF channel.3 
:: 
lt is significant to note that, whether before the Senate Committee. 
i 
! 
I! 
on interstate and Foreign Commerce or in articles written about UHF 
1rbid., P• 497. 2Ib .. l.d., P• 497-498. 
'i II 
1! 3The FCC reversed itself in the Evansville case. For its reason-
11, ing, see Report and Order, FCC Docket No. 11757 (February 26, 1957), in 
I
ll. Television Inquiry (1957), Part V, Allocations -Testimony of FCC, 
PP• 3216-3225. 
' 
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stations, testimony regarding "successful" UHF stations concerned itself 
with those stations which operated in an all-UHF market and feared the 
incursions of VHF by Federal CoiiDilunications Commission grant--as with 
WFIE-TV and 'tiBET--or were stations which were backed by networks that 
continued their support of UHF stations despite such stations' competi-
tion with VHF, In some cases, both facts were true. Many such UHF sta-
tiona, it might be noted, were located in the top 100 markets of the United 
States, 
The case of WNAO-TV, Raleigh, North Carolina, and WSEE-TV, Erie, 
Pennsylvania, were illustrative of the point. Both stations were owned by 
the same company, and both were UHF. Raleigh was ranked as the eightieth 
market in the United States; Erie, as the eighty-ninth.1 In Raleigh it-
self, the conversion rate to UHF in 1956 was 90 per cent and was W per 
cent in the surrounding area, In Erie, the conversion of UHF was rated at 
2 50 per cent. 
In Erie, the UHF station claimed 931 000 sets; but its VHF competi-
tor, 222,000. In Raleigh, the UHF station claimed Jl<o,ooo sets as con-
trasted with its VHF competitor's claim of 285,000 sets.3 Both UHF sta-
tions were backed with a Columbia Broadcasting System affiliation, and the 
owner testified that the network had remained with both stations in spite 
of strong VHF competition. In Erie, the network even switched its affilia-
tion from the VHF station to the UHF,4 
lTelevision Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public ana. 
Industry Witnesses, p. 383. 
3Ibid,, P• 388, 
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The owner testified that his company had gone into UHF broadcast-
ing on the reliance and inherent promise of the Sixth Report and Order and 
had invested ~1,300,000 in the two stations based on that reliance and in-
herent promise. As of March 1956, however, the stations had sustained a 
loss of more than ~650,000.1 In outlining his position, the owner stated 
that the company had petitioned the Federal Communications Commission to de-
intermix the Raleigh area in favor of UHF, in protest to a pending VHF grant 
in Raleigh, but that petition was denied. In the case of Erie, the company 
had requested a VHF channel in order to make the area all-vliF, but that 
petition also was denied. 2 Charging that the Commission had "evidenced an 
obstinate desire to destroy UHF,n3 the owner advocated two proposals to 
relieve the UHF situation: (1) that Congress create a tariff for the pro-
~ tection of the industry by reducing the 10 per cent tax on all-channel re-
ceivers to 5 per cent, at the same time raising the excise tax on VHF re-
ceivers to 15 per cent; and (2) that the Commission take immediate steps 
to deintermix such areas as Raleigh and Erie.4 
What emerged from these case histories was no one clear-cut cause 
of UHF station failures, or successes, for that matter. VHF stations 
proved to operate more efficiently than UHF in mountainous areas or in 
large cities with tall buildings where VHF could "fill in" white areas more 
easily than UHF. In rolling terrain or flat areas, however, UHF stations 
could match VHF in quaLity of service, but not in its range of service. 
Where UHF managed to exist, it existed alone or with few VHF competitors. 
11bid., P• 3b3. 2Ibia., PP• 385-386. ~id., P• 385. 
4Ibid., PP• 385-386. 
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Nothing illustrated this quite so well as the following figures. 
TABLE 2 
COMHERCIAL UHF STATIONS ON AIR JULY 20, 1957, BY TYPE HARKET 
UHF-only Markets ••••.•.••••.••••••••••• 
Intermixed UHF-VHF Markets With: 
One V1IF' ••• , • , •••••••••••••••••••••• 
'l'w'o 'V1IF • • • • • • • •••• • • • ••••••• • •••• • • 
Three Vlfli" •••••••• •••••••••••••••••• 
Totals: 
No. of 
Markets 
33 
19 
6 
_ 3_ 
61 
No. of UHF Stations 
in Markets 
46 
24 
6 
_3 _ 
79 
Source: Network Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297, P• 221. 
But, if the pattern for failure did not seem to be the same, the 
fact of failure led to some conclusions on the part of UHF owners. Case 
after case presented before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce during its 1956 television hearings told the same story of re-
quests for deintermixture and the denial of such requests; of seerrQng 
profits, but only where the station was backed by network and industry 
faith in a station located in a rich market area. In case after case, 
there was cited the "promise" inherent in the Sixth Report and Order for 
the protection of UHF by the Federal Communications Commission. Two 
thoughts, therefore, predominated the Senate's 1956 hearings on television: 
(l) how much had the industry, particularly the three networks, directly 
'or indirectly affected the growth of UHF; and (2) what had the Federal 
, Communications Commission done to aid the growth of television, UHF in 
1, particular. ,, 
,, 
CHAPTER III 
THE UHF SIWATION: A BROADER VIElV 
In the mass of testimony presented before the Senate Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee during the 1956 hearings on the allocations 
problem, one fact was evident: the individual UHF station owner believed 
that the key to his station's survival lay in deintermixture; that is, the 
creation of all-UHr' markets in those cities where UHF stations had become 
firmly established. However, two committees representing UHF stations took 
a broader view of the UHF problem. Representatives of ohe two committees--
the UHF' Industry Coorainating Committee ana the Committee from Hometown 
Television--presented their views separately before the Senate Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1956. Both representatives made spe-
cific charges against the networks and the Federal Communications Commis-
sian. The nature of these charges and the solutions offered for the UHF 
problem, although perhaps not subscribed to by every UHF station owner on 
each count, nonetheless pinpointed the major grievances of UHF station 
owners. 
The UHF Industry Coordinating Committee 
The UHF Indusory Coordinating Committee (00'-ICC) was organized in 
April 1954 and consisted of approximately eighty UHF stations and permit-
tees who had joined together in oraer to present their views before the 
Communications Subcommittee oi' the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee.! The lfrlF Committee's broad objective has been the modification 
!Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony or· Public and In-
dustry Witnesses, p. 330. The Communications Subcommittee, whose chairman 
in 1954 was Sen. Charles E. Potter (R., Mich.), has often been referred to 
as the npotter Subcommittee." 
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of the allocations plan as given in the Federal Communications Comwission1 s 
Sixth F:eport and Order. 1'he UHF Committee's specific objectives have been 
to modify the television assignment plan so as to eliminate the inequities 
between UHF and VHF' broadcasting and to insure "competitive opportunity 
among television broadcasters and networks as well as a diversity of 
national and local program services.•1 
The UHF Committee has been an active organization. In May 1955, for 
example, general members of the Committee met in WasLington to consider, 
among other matters, methods by which UHF broadcasters could meet equipment 
obligations; and methods of obtaining network programs for u1lF stations. 2 
As a result of the meeting, the UHF Committee organized a group to negotiate 
with television equipment manufacturers who might provide relief measures 
for UHF operators in serious financial trouble.) 
The bulk of the UHF Committee's work, however, involved represent-
ations to Congress and the Federal Communications Commission. The Commit-
tee's Chairman (Harold Thoms) and its working group kept the UY.F problem 
2Ibid., P• 334. 
3Ibid., P• 334. It may be noted at this point that the General 
• Electric Company, disturbed by the fact that it had three million dollars 
tied up in UHF equipment yet to be paid for in its warehouses and in the 
• hands of UHF operators not making money, approached a Hollywood group for 
the purpose of providing films for television. The combination formed 
called itself iiational Affiliateu Television Stations, Inc. HATS offered 
, the following to UHF stations: (l) management advice on the selection of 
i films; (2) the NATS film library of 210 film selections including westerns, 
i features and shorts on time payment plans; and (3) direct financial aid, 
:which General Electric supplied. GE ana NATS felt that the UHF stations 
~ may have failed because they attempted to produce live programs beyond their 
imeans. "Rescuing UHF, 11 Business Week (March 26, 1955), PP• 45-46. 
" 
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before members of Congress and kept careful check on the FCC in all matters 
which might affect UHF operators.1 
The ~' Industry Coordinating Corrmdttee and the Federal Communications 
Commission 
Between 1954 and 1956, the Federal Communications Commission took a 
series of steps in order to alleviate the UHF situation. In most instances, 
the UHF Committee disagreed with the action the FCC attempted to take and 
filed petitions to delay or revise proposed rulemaking. For example, the 
UHF' Committee noted that in 1954 the FCC issued a public notice stating 
that it would consider UHF satellite operation on a case-by-case basis.2 
The FCC also revised its multiple ownership rules to permit the ownership 
of a total of seven television stations provided that two were Urw.3 In 
1955, the FCC proposed rulemaking which would amend the Commission's rules 
to limit the location of antennas to within five miles of the principal 
city to be served, unless strong reasons to the contrary were shown.4 The 
Commission also announced that it was considering the authorization of 
lFor a chronological history of the Committee's actions, especially 
as applied to the following section, see Television Inquiry (1956), Part II 
Testimony of Public and Industry Witness, PP• 3~-339. 
2u.s. Federal Communications Commission, "Applications for UHF 
Television Stations Proposing No Local Progrannning, 11 FCC 54-991 (August 5, 
1954), in Federal Register, XIX (August 14, 1954), P• 5144. 
3u.s. Federal Communications Commission, "Kultiple Ownership of 
Television Broadcast Stations," Docket No. 10822, F'CC 54-1185, Rules Arndt. 
3-20, (September 17, 1954), in Federal Register, XIX (September 23, 1954), 
pp. 6099-6102. 
4u .s. Federal Communications Commission, "Transmitter Location and 
i Antenna System, 11 Docket No. 11297, FCC 55-268 (Harch 2, 1955), in Federal 
·· Register, XX (l1arch 9, 1955), PP• 1410-1411. 
,, 
1 private microwave systems. 
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Among other general actions taken during 1955 which affected the 
UHF problem, the FCC urgea Congress to grant the Commission funds to conauct 
a study of netwcrks; 2 requested that Congress encourage production of all-
channel sets by removing the manufacturers' excise tax;3 invited comments 
on subscription television;4 ana went on record to say that it was consider-
ing whether limited deinterrr~xture might be appropriate as a solution to 
the UHF problem.5 The UHF Co~~ttee favored the network stuay, the removal 
of the excise tax, and subscription television. On the other hanc, the 
Committee was critical of the Commission's handling of satellite operations, 
revision of the multiple ownership rules, the five-mile rule, private micro-
t~ave systems, and deintermixture. 
~atellite Operations and the Revision of t!ultiple Ownership hules.-6 
Neither the FCC's authorization of satellite operations nor the 
revision of multiple ownership rules were acceptabls to the UHE' Committee.7 
The Cormnittee criticized the revision of the multiple ownership rules as a 
!Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony oi Public and in-
dustry Witnesses, P• 333. 
2FCC, Twenty-First Annual Report, 1955, p. 107. 
3relevision Inquiry (1957), Part V, Allocations - Testimony of FCC, 
pp. 3162-3163. 
4Fcc, Twenty-First Annual Report, 1955, PP• 98-99. 
5Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and In-
',dustry Witnesses, P• 333. 
6supra, p. 36. 
, 7Television 
! vii tnesses, p. 331. 
I 
I 
:: 
Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and Industry' 
:: 
measure which would noo solve the UHF problem but would instead promote 
a monopolistic concenoraoion of soations in the nands of networks and 
other multiple station owners. With regard to the authorization of satel-
lite operations, the UHF Committee pointed out in a letter to the FCC that, 
because the Commission would also permit VHF stations to operate satellites, 
the rule would only widen the gap in the performance of VHF and UHF sta-
tions. Chairman Thoms urged the Commission to postpone "the effective date 
of the saoellite order and proceed on a rule which would limit VHF satellite 
operation. The Committee charged that the Commission rejected the prooest 
because it desired to leave the satellioe policy "flexible."1 
The Five-¥~e Rule.-2 The request for proposed rulemaking was made 
by UHF station WKNX-TV, Saginaw, Michigan. The UHF Committee followed the 
proceeding with interest because it felt that the rule would prevent 
market-straddling, or market-hopping, by television soations which lo-
cated transmitters closer to a market more desirable than the one to which 
they were assigned. The proposed rulemaking, however, was reversed by the 
F'ederal Communications Commission. 3 
Private l'licrowave Systems.- In support or "the Feaeral Communica-
tions Commission's proposed rulemaking which would authorize television 
1Ibid. See footnote on page cited. 2ciupra, P• 36. 
3Television Inquiry (1956), Faro II, Tesoimony of Public and In-
dustry Witnesses, p. 333. See also FCC, Twenty-First Annual Report, 1955, 
pp. 97-98. On November ':J, 1955, the FCC denied the proposal that TV trans-
mitters be located within five miles of the nearest boundary of the princi-
pal city to be served. The Commission was, in essence, soanding by its 
allocation table. 
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broadcasters to operate private microwave relay systems, the UHF Committee 
offered four argwnents: 1 
(1) Many staoions, particularly small ones, were located in 
communities distant from large urban centers and such stations were 
charged exorbitant rates by the common carriers for connecting the 
smal~ stations with the large ones. 
(2) The Committee believed that the public interest was af-
fected because the stations were unable to connect with the larger 
stations at reasonable rates. 
(3) Simultaneous broadcasting of programs was vitally im-
portant to stations. 
(4) The UHF Committee linked national emergencies with its 
reasoning that all stations serving a common area be connected for 
program broadcasts. 
The UHF Committee noted that the FCC's proposal was "strongly op-
posed by the telephone company and by no one else. 112 While urging that the 
rulemaking be adopted, the Committee felt that nothing would be done, ob-
serving that 11it still reraains unacted on, 16 months after the Commission 
1Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and 
Industry Witnesses, P• 332. 
2 b"-I J.O. 
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proposed its adoption.nl 
Deintermixture.- In 1954, the UHF' Committee had taken the position 
that the public interest could be served if all stations were assigned to 
one portion of the spectrwn and urged that a shift be made to the seventy 
channels in the UHF bands. 2 Despite the Federal Collllllunications Comrnis-
sion•s defense of its deintermixture policy, the UHF Comrnittee was en-
couraged by congressional interest in the shift to UHF. 'l.'he Comrnittee be-
lieved that the congressional recess in 1954 enabled powerful lobbying 
interests to block the move of the entire television broadcasting system 
into the UHF portion of the spectrum. As a result, the JJ:'.} Comrni ttee de-
cided that the next best move would be to urge selective deintermixture--
1Ibid. The FCC had this to say about ·rv intercity relay stations: 
"The present growth of TV network systems has been made possible largely by 
the rapid expansion of intercity transmission facilities operated by com-
munications common carriers. These facilities are designed and built to 
provide the degree of reliability and quality expected of collllllunications 
common carrier systems and include duplicate equipment and alternate cir-
cuits. Consequently, t.IJ.ey are costly to build and maintain. 
TV broadcast stations in the smaller cities with limited revenues 
often find it impossible to meet the cost of obtaining network service via 
COllllllon carrier facilities. Privately operated TV relay systems, although 
aQ~ttedly less reliable than common carrier circuits, may be built and 
operated at a fraction of the cost of common carrier facilities. Conse-
quently, many TV licensees seek Commission permission to operate private 
relay systems. The common carriers oppose this on the grounc:is that fur-
ther expansion of national TV network systems depends on such circuits be-
ing operated by common carriers. 
The Commission has instituted proceedings looking tow2rd relaxing its 
present requirement, which permit privately operated intercity relay tele-
vision transmission systems only when common carrier facilities are not 
available and then only until such common carrier facilities can be con-
i structea. A special committee of Comrnissioners is studying the problem." 
FCC, lventy-Second Annual Report, 1956, p. 108. 
2The material in this section referring to the unF Committee and 
deintermixture is taken from the brief filed by the UHF Committee during 
the 1956 Senate television hearings. See Television Inquiry (1956), Part 
:1 II, Testimony oi' Public and Industry Witnesses, PP• 330-339. 
L 
a moTe which at least would protect existing UHF sta•ions. 
When the UHF Committee realized that not even selectiTe deintermix-
ture was acceptable to the FCC, it urged its member stations to petition 
the Commission individually, on a case-by-case basis. A number of proposals 
were submitted to the Commission for the ~elective deintermixture of parti-
cular markets. The UHF Committee charged that the Commission denied these 
proposals, giving as its reason the belief that such action would be unfair 
to VHF applicants who had expended large sums of money in applications for 
VHF channels. 
The petitions of the UHF stations haC! some effect, however. The 
Commission reconsidered the deintermixture of four cities: Peoria, Evans-
ville, Madison, ana Hartford. The Commission called for data pertinent to 
deintermixture proceedings and held hearings in June 1955. Throughout the 
summer of 1955, however, no action was taken on the pending deintermixture 
proposals. The UHF Committee heard that the Commission had met in secret 
session with the networks to consider allocation plans and that the majority 
of the Commission had decided to vote against all deintermixture requests. 
The UHF Committee immediately filed petitions in protest, request-
ing formal proceedings. In November, 1955, the Committee learned that the 
FCC had formally rejected deintermixture.1 Those UHF stations involved 
libid., p. 337. See also FCC, Twenty-First Annual Report, 1955, 
pp. 95-96:--The FCC noted the arguments of the UHF' owners, but went on to 
state: 0 0n November 10, 1955, the Commission denied 35 such petitions pend-
ing a general rule-making proceeding to consider possible solutions, on a 
nation-wide basis, to the difficulties hindering expansion of TV service. 
It invited proposals for changes in standards concerning station separa-
tions, power, antenna height, directional antennas, etc., and their effect 
on existing stations, educational reservations, and receivers." 
!• 
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filed petitions to the Commission ana., where the FCC had made VHF grants 
in UHF markets, the stations requested the court to stay those grants. On 
December 14, 1955, the FCC reconsidered its rejection of deintermixture 
petitions, except in those cases where VHF grants had been made. The UHF 
Committee immediately filed comments with the Commission, outlining three 
specific recommendations to guide the FCC in deintermixture cases: 
(1) Resolve pending proposals aimed at eliminating the 
intermixture of UHF and VHF by completely severing the question 
of selective deintermixture from the proceedings, at the same 
time granting requests for deintermixture which had been the 
subject of rulemaking proceedings. 
(2) Assign television stations at lower channel separa-
tions, but insure that additional stations created would not 
interfere with the operation of any uru· station. 
(3) Confine stations to their own communities by 
limiting the permissive range of maximum power.l 
The UHF Inc.ustry Coordinating Collllni ttee and Congress 
When Congress was recessed in 1954, the UHF Committee held hope 
that something would be done to alleviate the UHF situation. 2 Between 1954 
and 1956, however, Congress held no hearings on the UHF problem. There 
were two measures in which Congress acted which involved UHF. But neither 
proved satisfactory to the UHF Committee. One of these involved the major-· 
lTelevision Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and 
Industry "itnesses, p. 338. 
2~., p. 331. 
" 
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ity ana minority counsel studies which had been ordered by the Senate 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in 1954. The other measure con-
cerned a bill which would modify the protest provisions of the Commllllica-
1 tions Act of 1934. 
The Hajori ty and I'Iinority Counsel Studies.- In 1954, the Senate 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee ordered that a report of the VHF 
allocations problem be made by majority counsel Robert F. Jones and minor-
ity counsel Harry N. Plotkin. It was not until 1955 that the two reports 
were released, and the UHF Committee dubbed the majority counsel report 
"timid and ambivalent.n1 The UHF Committee took particular exception to 
the majority counsel report which, while urging that the Federal Communica-
tions Commission reconsider deintermixture, purportedly stated that broad-
coverage Vlll'' stations were the only means by which service to rural areas 
could be provided, and that it would not be fair to the public to require 
conversion to UHF no matter how long a transition period were provided. 2 
Protest Provisions of the Conununications Act of 1934.- JJuring the 
summer of 1955, congressional hearings were hela on bills H.R. 5614 and 
0. 1648, recorrnnended by the Federal Conununications Commission, which would 
modify the protest provisions of the 1934 Con~unications Act. The amend-
ment to section 309 (c) of the Act was designed primarily to prevent pro-
tests from being used by competitors for the purpose of dela;ying new radio 
libid., p. 332. 
2cf., "The Jones Report on Television, 11 Broadcasting-l'elecasting 
(February 21, 1955), pp. 35-50. The writer could not find specific refer-
ence in the Jones report, reprinted in its entirety, to rrlF stations as the 
only means by which service to rural areas could be providea. See also 
"Network Domination Damned by Plotkin: Television Network Regulations and 
the UHF Problem," Broadcasting-Telecasting (February 7, 1955), PP• 39-68. 
:: 
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ana television services.1 The proposal was intended to give the FCC 
authority to deny a protest without holding a full hearing, where the 
Commission found that the facts, even if true, would not be grounds for 
setting aside the grant being protested. The proposaL also would give 
the Commission the power to keep a protested grant in effect pending the 
outcome of the protest hearing. 
The uHF Committee, represented by its counsel, appeared before 
both the House and Senate Committees on Interstate and Foreign Conunerce to 
2 present its views regarding the "protest" bills. The UHF Committee sup-
ported those features of the bill which would give the Commission greater 
-discretion in determining whether a hearing should be held on particular 
protests. But it urged a revision which would permit a protested grant 
pending a hearing to become effective only where the public interest com-
pelled institution of service. 
The UHF Committee pleaded that section 309 (c) of the Act protected 
the rights of UHF operators who were entitled to a hearing in those cases 
where the Commission considered grants which would result in market strad-
dling, encroachments on utiF service areas, and monopolistic practices.3 
The Cormni ttee pointed out that were a Vill' grant protested by a wbF station 
made effective by the FCC during the perioci that a hearing was being held, 
participation by the uhF' station involved would be futile and needlessly 
expensive. Despite the pleas of the uHF Committee, the protest bill was 
lFcc, 1'Wenty-First Annual Report, 1955, P• 19. 
2Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and In-
dustry Witnesses, PP• 334-335. 
3Ibid., P• 335. 
;: 
l passed by both houses of Congress. 
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The 1956 Senate Television Hearings and the UHF Committee.- On 
February 27, 19561 UHF Committee Chairman Harold Thoms once again appeared 
before the Senate Committee on Interstate ana Foreign Commerce as he had 
during the Senate Committee's 1954 television hearings. He labeled the 
Federal Communication Commission's desire to consiaer deintermixture on a 
2 
nationwide basis as making 11no sense." It was the UHF Committee's view 
that the "public interest" was not served when two stations were forced off 
the air by the arbitrary assignment of one station according to a fixed 
allocation plan) Thoms stated that there were many broadcasters who would 
be willing to invest capital were competitively equal facilities made 
available. 4 Competitive equality could be attained were the Commission to 
draw up a reallocation plan based on the premise that television stations 
should be assigned to serve homogeneous markets and specific communi ties. 
Thoms observed that the "abnormal" profits made in raaio and tele-
vision had come about through the scarcity of stations.5 The situation had 
been fostered by the allocation policies of the Federal Communications Com-
mission, creating forces of "haves" and "have-nota." He charged that if 
lpublic Law 391 was approved January 20, 1956. It provided that 
the FCC might deny a protest, after oral argument, without full evidentiary 
hearing, where the ECC found that the facts alleged by the protestants even 
if proved true would not be grounds for setting aside the grant, The law 
also permitted the FCC to keep a protested grant in effect pending the out-
come of the protest hearing. FCC, Twenty-Second Annual Report, 19561 p. 23. 
2Television Inquiry (1956) Part II, Testimony of Public and Inaustry 
Witnesses, P• 34o. 
3Ibid., pp. 
4Ibid,, P• 
347-3IIB. 
352. 5Ibid., PP• 352-353. 
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the "haves" had not thrown roadblocks in the way of UHF stations which 
were demanding that something be done, the nation could have been well on 
its way to an "effective nationwide competitive system based upon a sound 
reallocation.•1 Although Thoms believed that the restrictive practices 
of the networks should be studied because the practices deprived broad-
casters of an opportunity to compete fairly for network programs, he be-
lieved that measures resulting from the studies would not get to the core 
of the UHF-VHF problem. The UHF problem was the result of the Commission's 
application o:f its allocation plan. Because the Commission had shOiin that 
it was inclined to temporize rather than act, Thoms believed that Congress 
had to act by directing the Commission toward a specific reallocation 
plan. 
He outlined eight principles which the UHF Committee felt were 
necessary for the establishment of a nationwide, competitive television 
service in the United States. These eight principles summarized the 
petitions made to the Commission by the UHF Committee, as well as the 
series of protest actions taken to protect tl!U' stations from 1954 to 1956. 
They were as follows: 
1. Deintermixture. 
2. Reduction of the present perm:Lssi ve limits of power. 
3. Reduction of the present permissive limits of antenna 
heights. 
4. Reduction o:f presently prescribed VHF mileage separa-
tions. 
5. Confinement of television stations to their home com-
munities. 
6. Provision for the use of directional antennas wherever 
necessary to accomplish the foregoing objectives. 
1Ibid •• p. 352. 
!' 
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7. Elimination of cost differentials for all-band sets. 1 
8. Reduction of common carrier cable and microwave relay 
costs,2 
The Committee for Hometown Television, Inc. 
This organization, a non-profit group incorporated unaer Connecti-
cut State laws, was formed in 1555 to (1) promote and support the develop-
ment of hometown television stations and (2) study and support rooans for 
furthering hometown television as a public community service) 'i'he Com-
mittee was comprised of a group of television stations in New England, with 
membership consisting of UHF and VEF stations alike. Its president was 
i Philip l1erryman, operator of UrJ:i' station r:rcc-·rv, Bridgeport, Connecticut. 
Superpower Television Stations 
The Commit tee was in general concerned with the problems facing 
, all l.JliF operators, but its testi1nony during the 1956 Senate television 
hearings concerned one special feature barely touched on by the UHF In-
dustry Coordinating Committee: superpower television stations. 
ln a brief filed before the Senate Interstate and F'oreign Commerce 
Co~~ttee, the Hometown Committee pointed out that, as of 1956, there was 
. not one single television station in the State of New Jersey with the ex-
l]bid,, P• 353. Under questioning during the 1956 television hear-
ing, 11loms agreed that a reduction of the excise tax on TV receivers (as 
imposed by section 4141 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) would be one 
way of eliminating cost differentials since it would enable manufacturers 
i. to equip sets with all-channel tuners. No other plan was suggested by 
; 1'homs during his testimony. 
2Television Inguiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and In-
i'dustry Witnesses, p. 34. 
3Ibid., P• 446. 
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ception of WATV--licensed to Newark, but operating from the Lmpire State 
1 
Building in New York City.1 The state, however, had thirty radio stations 
" 
as of 1956. The Committee observed that if the citizens of Trenton, 
Passaic, or New Brunswick wished to have local issues aired, they were 
forced to go to the television stations in New York City or Philadelphia 
for television time. 
\vith regard to Connecticut, the Hometown Committee stated that 
thirteen commercial channels had been allocated to nine cities. 2 3ut be-
cause these cities were within range of the powerful stations located in 
New York, Providence, and 'Josten, only five stations were in operation in 
Connecticut. All but one or two were having difficulty in surviving. On 
the other hand, there were thirty-one radio stations in operation in the 
State of Connecticut, In Hassachusetts, twenty-five television channels 
were allocated for use in fourteen conmunities,3 But only one educational 
and six commercial television stations were in operation in 1956, four of 
them in the metropolitan area of Boston-cambridge. 4 llassachusetts, how-
ever, had seventy-three radio stations. 
The Hometown Committee charged that the Feder<l Communications 
Commission had done nothing to aid either hometown television or Dl-IF sta-
tions in other areas of the country, but rather had helped television in 
metropolitan areas at the expense of hometown television by two actions 
which the Commission had taken. One, it had attempted to raise the maximum 
1 Ibid., P• 451. 2Ibid., p. 451. )Ibid., P• 451. 
4one of the six Massachusetts television 
Cambridge, suspended operation in 1956. 
stations cited, ~ITAO-TV, 
!: 
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power of UHF stations.1 The Hometown Committee opposed the Commission's 
move to raise -che power of UHF s-ca•ions to five million wa"tts because the 
cost of transmitters capable of producing such power would be high and 
only the large city sta-cions could afford -co purchase the transmitters, 
Two, the Commission had raised the maximum tower height for vtiF sta"tions 
in Zone I from 1,000 to 1,250 feet. 2 Tower height meant increased cover-
age for VHF stations. 
Iiomestown Television Recommenda-cions during the 19~6 Senate Television 
Hearings 
The Hometown Television Committee's recommendations to the Senate 
Committee on Inters-cate and Foreign Commerce was divided into two parts. 
The first part consis-ced of three proposals, or "steps, 11 which might pro-
teet television. These were as follows: 
Step 1: Each station's signal coverage must be conformed 
to the retail trading area of its community. In acting upon 
applications for new stations in other communities, any inter-
ference that does not invade this service area should not be 
considered objectionable, Hand in hand with this limitation 
must go rejection of any application for increase in tower height 
or power limit or for sa-cellite sta-cions. 
Step 2: In the towns thus uncovered to local television, 
the Commission should license the operation of stations capable 
of providing hometown television. In deciding which communities 
can qualify for licenses in the uncovered areas, three criteria 
should be applied, namely, (1) Will the new license create a white 
area? (2) Will the new license provide hometown television'? (3) Will 
the new license provide television to more people than will be de-
prived of television by the proposal? As a corollary action, an 
engineering stuoy should be initiated to determine how to provide 
more signals with smaller separations - a study analogous 
1Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and In-
dusl:;Xy Witnesses, p. 452, 
2Ibid., p. 451. The FCC, however, reversed itself in •his, 
order was not made effective. See FCC, Twenty-Second Annual Report, 
P• 97 • 
The 
1956, 
:: 
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to the FCC reappraisal of racio 1 s pennissable separations. 
Step 3: A policy of deintermixturE<, favoring UHF 
operation where practicable, should be instituted.l 
The second portion of the Hometown Committee's recommenaations 
more directly concerned the lJ1!F problem as alreacy discussed in the section 
of this chapter pertaining to the UHF Industry Coordinating Committee. In 
! brief, however, the Hometown Committee urged the following: 
(l) T'ne Commission should use its full autbori ty to make 
special regulations which would "compel" a greater availability 
of network programs to 00' stations. 
(2) The Commission should grant relief to VriF stations by 
making it possible for all operating LliF stations to occupy the 
lower portion of the UHF band. 
(3) The Commission should reduce antenna heights. 
(4) 1he Commission should revise its satellite policy so 
as to prevent metropolitan stations from extending coverage by 
use of satellites. 
(5) The Commission should limit UhF stations to only one 
million watts maximum power. 
( 6) The Commission should create a psychological atmosphere 
which would show that it was irrevocably committed to make UHF 
succeed. 2 
1Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and In-
dustry 1-Jitnesses, p. 456. 
2~., PP• 458-459. 
" 
i: 
" 
:: 
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sll!l!lllB.I'Y 
The testimony of both Thoms and Merryman touched at many points. 
Yet, as can be seen, the problems that UHF operators have faced--although 
these may have appeared on the surface to be common--have varied with the 
area involved and the interests of the operators themselves. It is signi-
ficant, furthermore, that neither group in their recommendations or testi-
mony given before the Senate Committee seemed aware of the fact that broad-
casting constituted only a portion to which the total spectrum was put to 
' use. The liHF Industry Coordinating Committee, for exampLe, saw no diffi-
culty in changing the current alloca"tion plan because, as it was put, UHF 
assignments were "relatively abundant.nl What might happen later as are-
sult of the immediate changes was no concern of the operators requesting 
such reallocations. 
:: 
Another interesting facet of the testimony was the fact that al-
though urging an investigation of the networks, the UHF Coordinating Com-
mittee placed less stress on the networks' effects on UHF than it did the 
policies of the Federal Communications Commission. It was qui"te apparent 
that the UHF operators found a grea"ter need for the networks than they did 
for an arm of the government. The Hometown Committee, on the other hand, 
was less interested in the power of the networks to produce good, but 
seemed to believe that television would evolve as had raaio into a local 
broadcasting industry i~ television were only given a chance to grow as 
hac radio. The Hometown Committee "therefore urged more stringent control 
of the networks than did the UHF Coordinating Committee. But both groups 
1Ibid., p. .348. 
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were in agreement that the television pie was a large one which could 
bear small cuts for all and that it was the job of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to do the cutting, unoer supervision of Congress. 1 
1Ibid., PP• 351, 458-460. 
" 
CHAPTER IV 
'l'H:S 11ECONCHICS11 OF TH6 U.S. 
'l'EL.B."VISIOH SYS1'El'l 
At the close of fiscal year 1952, only sixty-three communities 
had one or more local commercial television stations.1 Of these twenty-
three had two or more. The tctal number of receivers in the hands of the 
1 
public in 1952 was approximately fifteen million. 
At the close of fiscal year 1957, however, 302 conm1unities had one 
or more commercial television stations in operation. Of these 80 had two 
stations, 27 had three, and ll had four or more. Ninety per cent of the 
population in the Unitec States was estimated to be within service range 
of at least one television station at the close of fiscal year 1957; over 
75 per cent was within range of two or more stations. P~proXimately 44.5 
million sets were in use during 1957, representing approximately 80 per 
cent of all homes in the country. This listener investment in television 
has been estimated at $20 billion.2 
Advertisers' expenditures for television also have grown immensely 
from year to year. In 1949, for example, advertising expenditures tctaled 
lu.s. Federal Connnunications Commission, Twenty-Third Annual he-
r port, fiscal Year 1957 (Hashing ton: Government Printing Office, 1958), 
p. 105. Cited hereafter as FCC, Twenty-Third Annual Report, 1957. 
2u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, Allocation of TV Channels, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee 
on Allocations (Committee Report), 85~Q Gong., 2d Sess. (Washingtcn: 
Government Printing Office, 195 c), p. 35. This report is sometimes re-
ferred tc as the "Jowles Report" for its chairman (Edward L. Bowles, 
Jviassachusetts Institute of 'I'echnology). It will be cited hereafter as Ad 
Hoc Committee Report on Alloca•ion of Tv Channels (1958). 
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;;;58 million; in 1955, ~;1 billion; and in 1956, ~1.2 billion.1 In eig.u.t 
years, telev:ision advertising expenditures increased from 1.1 per cent to 
12.6 per cent of the volume of advertising in all media. 2 
Yearly Revenues of the Telev:ision 
Broadcasting Industry 
From 1948 to 1952, the aggregate revenue from television broad-
casting operations rose from $8.7 million to $324.2 million. 3 In 1953, 
the Federal Connuunications Commission reported that the television broad-
casting industry's total annual revenue was ;)432.7 million, or 33.5 per 
cent higher than that reported for 1952.4 In 1954, telev:ision revenue had 
risen to :Ri593 million.5 In 1955, the revenues were :;;.744. 7 million; in 
1956, the revenues were :1;896.9 million; and in 1957, :,,1943.2 million. 6 
On the surface, these were impressive figures. But they did not 
represent the entire story. For example, they did not indicate the tele-
vision broadcasting industry's income, the expense involved, or the number 
111Advertisers Guide to Harketing," Printers Ink, 1958, PP• 54-55. 
2Although the bulk of the expenditures went to the major TV net-
works and all telev:ision stations in the U • .s., a part of the totals cited 
above went to advertising agencies, other intermediate agents, and to fiL~ 
syndicators. 
3FCc, Fifteenth Annual Report, 1949, P• 54. See also u.s. Federal 
Cormnunications Commission, Nineteenth Annual Report, Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 1953 (Washington: Government PrintL~g Office, 1954), P• 115. 
Cited hereafter as FCC, Nineteenth Annual Report, 1953. 
4u.s. Federal Cormnunications Commission, Twentieth Annual Report, 
Fiscal Year 1954 ('ilashington: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. llO. 
Cited hereafter as FCC, Twentieth Annual Report, 1954. 
5Fcc, Twenty-First Annual Report, 1955, p. 120. 
&~"CC, 11E'inal TV Broadcast Financial Data--1957, 11 Public Notice-B 
63000 (August 27, 1958), Table 1. 
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of stations sharing in the profits. These facts may best be seen in the 
following table. 
Year 
19462 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
TA:3LE 3 
P.EV;,NUES, ~j;;flib.~:.S, AND l:JIRNLmS OF ALL TV STATlONS: 1946-1957 
Summaries of Financial Data Compiled Annually 
by the FCC Economic Division 
(Dollar Figures in Hillions) 
llo. of Stns Broadcast Broadcast :earnings Before 
Reporting P.evenues J:;xpenses Fed1 l Taxl 
10 $0.5 
----------------------
15 1.9 
----------------------50 8.7 $ 23.6 ($14.9) 
98 .34.3 59.6 ( 25.3) 
107 105.9 ll5.l ( 9.2) 
108 235.7 194.1 41.6 
122 324.2 268.7 55.5 
3.34 432.7 364.7 68.0 
410 593.0 502.7 90.3 
437 744-7 594.5 150.2 
474 896.9 707.3 189.6 
501 943.2 783.2 160.0 
lparenthesis denotes loss. 2No figures available for blank columns. 
Sources: Television Factbook, XIII, l''all-Winter, 1957, p. 30j and 
FCC, "Final TV Broadcast Financial Data--195 7, 11 Public Notice-3 63000 
(August 27, 1958), Table 1. 
As the compilation sholiEld, broadcast revenues rose, but so did 
broadcast expenses. Television stations, from 1951 to 1957, have paid out 
from three-fourths to two-tllirds of annual revenues in broadcast expenses. 
One may ask, "How much did the networks earn during those years?" A com-
parison between columns six and seven of the following table will show 
that the networks' 11 take11 from 1951 to 1957 rose from one quarter to 
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approximately one-half of the total annual income. 
Year 
19462 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
19553 
1956 
1957 
TABLE 4 
R1V~ii3, JCXYEN SliS, AND ;o;AlliliNGS OY NET$: 1946-1957 
Summaries of Financial Data Compiled Annually 
by the FCC Economics Division 
(Dollar Figures in Billions) 
No. of Networks and Cwned and o:eerated Stations 
Nets 
No. of Broadcast Broadcast Earned Before 
3tns Revenues Expenses Fed 1 l Taxl 
Total In-
dustry 
Earnings 
---------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------
4 10 $4.8 $11.2 ( ;;,6.4) (14.9) 
4 14 19.3 31.4 (12.1) ( 25. 3) 
4 14 55.5 65.5 (10.0) ( 9.2) 
4 15 128.4 117.4 11.0 41.6 
4 15 180.2 170.3 9.9 55.5 
4 16 231.7 213.7 18.0 68.0 
4 16 306.7 270.2 36.5 90.3 
4 16 374.0 306.0 68.0 150.2 
3 15 442.3 356.9 85.4 189.6 
3 16 467.9 397.2 70.7 160.0 
lparenthesis denotes loss. 2No figures available for blank columns. 
3Three networks after September 15, 1955, when Dui~ont ceased net-
work operation. 
Sources: Television Factbook, XIII, Fall-winter, 1957, p. 30; and 
FCC, "Final TV Broadcast Fi!lancial Data--1957, 11 Public Notice-B 63000 
(August 27, 1958), Table 1. 
As has been seen, the networks had sustained approximately one-half 
of the television broadcasting industry's losses during 1948 and 1949. In 
1950, they absorbed virtually all of the losses. The Federal Communi.ca-
tions Commission had not tabulated figures prior to 1948. However, the 
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two major networks--the National Broadcasting Company and the Columbia 
Broadcasting Syst~n--have stated that 1955 was the year in which both 
companies were able to break even with the losses they had sustained in 
developing television.1 
Of far more interest to this thesis are those figures which show 
the profits and losses of "other" television stations, particularly UHF. 
These have been compiled in Table 5. 2 It will be noted that the pre-freeze 
VIiF stations began to show earnings as a group in 1950. The post-freeze 
stations, on the other hand, did not show a profit until 1955. The UHF 
stations have never shown a profit as a group. 
Thus far, the tables have shown that the pre-freeze television 
stations suffered losses during their early years of operation. Profitable 
returns were first made by those stations in 1955. The best year for the 
television broadcasting industry as a whole was the year 1956, when the 
·total earnings before federal tax were ~189.6 million. The largest number 
of Ui}· stations reported during any year between 1952 and 1957 was 125 in 
1954. That year was also the worst for UHF station losses, 
These, however, have been conclusions <irawn from "gross" figures. 
What could be shown by market totals? The Federal Cmmnunication Commis-
? 
sion's 1conomics Division compiled figures for 1957 market statistics.~ 
In brief, these figures showed that 231 television stations in seventy 
markets having three or more television stations earned ;:;106,8 million in 
!Television Inquiry (1956), Part IV, Network Practices, pp. 2020-
2264. 
2For Table 5, see the following page. 
3Fcc, "Individual !1arket Data--1957," Public Notice-B 63000 
(August 27, 1958), 
58 
TABLE 5 
REVENUES, EXPENSES, AND EARimms OF OT"tlER TV STATIONS: 1946-1957 
Summaries of Financial Data Compiled .Annually by the FCC Eco-
nomics Division (Dollar Figures in hillions) 
Year 
19462 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 (total) 
Pre-freeze 
Post-freeze 
1953 (total) 
Pre-freeze3 
Post-freeze vllF' 
UHF 
1954 (total) 
Pre-freeze 
Post-freeze VHF' 
illiF 
1955 (total) 
Pre-freeze 
Post-freeze VEF 
Uhl' 
1956 (total) 
Pre-freeze 
Post-freeze vill' 
UHF 
1957 (total) 
Pre-freeze 
Post-freeze VHF' 
UHF 
No. of 
Stns 
Eeport-
ing 
40 
84 
93 
93 
107 
93 
14 
318 
92 
114 
112 
394 
92 
177 
125 
421 
93 
225 
103 
459 
95 
269 
95 
485 
95 
302 
88 
Other Stations Tota.l 
Industry 
Broadcast Broadcast Earnings Before Earnings 
Revenues J::xpenses Fed '1 Taxl 
;;;3.9 
15.0 
50.4 
107.3 
14)j.O 
143.4 
o.6 
201.0 
174-5 
16.1 
10.4 
286.3 
200.9 
60.0 
25.4 
370.0 
230.0 
112.2 
28.5 
454.6 
260.7 
161.4 
32.5 
475.3 
261.3 
187.3 
26.7 
:;,12.4 
29.0 
49.6 
76.7 
98.4 
97.6 
o.e 
151.0 
114.0 
20.3 
16.7 
232.5 
133.3 
63.8 
35.4 
288.5 
148.1 
107.4 
33.0 
350.4 
171.0 
145.0 
34.4 
386.0 
179.3 
176.5 
30.2 
(i;.8.5) 
(13.5) 
.e 
30.6 
45.6 
45.8 
( 0.2) 
50.0 
60.5 
( 4.2) 
( 6.3) 
53.8 
67.6 ( 3.8) 
(10.0) 
81.5 
81.9 
4.8 
( 4.5) 
104.2 
89.7 
16.4 
( 1.9) 
89.3 
82.0 
10.8 
( 3.5) 
(~14.9) 
( 25.3) 
( 9.2) 
41.6 
55.5 
68.0 
90.3 
150.2 
189.6 
160.0 
lparenthesis denotes loss. 2No figures available for blank columns. 
3The change in the number of pre-freeze stations reporting is be-
cause stations with incomes below $25,000 are not required to report. 
Sources: Television Fa.ctbook, XIII, Fall-Winter, 
FCC, "Final TV Broadcast Financial Data,n Public Notice-B 
1958), Table 1. 
1957, p. 30; and 
63000 (August 27, 
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1957. Fifty-nine of the seventy markets were in the top 100 market list-
ing.1 Ten were in the top 169 market listing. One, Honolulu, was outside 
the United States proper. 
The top market in the United States is New York City. The Commis-
sion 1 s figures showed that New York City's seven VHF stations earned ap-
proximately ~21.3 million during 1957,2 Los Angeles, the third-ranking city 
in the United States, can boast seven VHF stations. These earned approxi-
mately $5.9 million in 19~/. The Evansville, Indiana, market--ranked as 
the l02d--showed a loss of ~2611 771 for its two UHF and one VHF stations 
in 1957. The Tampa-St. Petersburg market (two UHF and one VHF stations) 
showed a loss of ~383,692. The Tampa market ranked as the 42d, 
The Commission's Economics Division tabulated figures for 207 other 
markets having less than three television stations. Two hundred and forty-
eight "other" stations in the 207 markets earned approximately $22.4 mil-
lion,3 The same figures showed that for all 277 markets approximately one-
half of the time sales revenues came from national and regional advertisers 
and sponsors. The remainaer came from local advertisers. 
Comparative Figures: Profits ana Losses 
of Post-Freeze UHF and VHF Stations 
Figures for the Period January to October 1954 
In l95S, the Federal Communications Commission issued a report on 
lFor a list of the top 169 markets, see Television Inquiry (1957), 
Part V, Allocations - Testimony of FCC, PP• 3192-3193. 
2roc, "Individual Market Data--195'1," Public Notice-B 63000 
(August 27, 1958). 
3Ibid. 
its third survey of post-freeze television stations.1 The survey showed 
that of 144 post-freeze VHF stations fifty-two (36 per cent) haa been oper-
ating profitably during the ten-mon"h period, January 1 through October 
1954. Fifty other VHF stations (35 per cent) reported an overall loss for 
the ten-month period, but showed a monthly profit in October and one or 
more earlier months. Forty-two VHF s"ations (29 per cent) showea continu-
ing monthly losses through October 1954. However, only one of these forty-
two VHF stations ceased operation by June 4, 1955. 
The figures for the post-freeze UHF stations, however, told an en-
tirely different story. One hunared and twenty-two of the 124 UHF stations 
which were operated during January 1 through October 1954 reported to the 
Commission. 2 Of the 122 UHF stations, eighteen (15 per cent) indicated 
that they had operated profitably between January and October 1954. 
Fifteen others (12 per cent) reported an overall operating loss during the 
ten-month period, but showed a monthly profit in October and one or more 
earlier months. Eighty-nine UHF stations (73 per cent) reported continuing 
monthly losses. Of the eighty-nine, thir~J-one (35 per cent) haa suspenaed 
operation by June 4, 1955. 
The Commission reported that the meoian monthly loss for those UHF 
and VHF stations with continuing monthly losses (and still in operation as 
of June 4, 1955) was $e,460. For VHF stations, the median monthly loss was 
$8,'150. For UHF stations, the median monthly loss was $8,260. The •me-
dian" figures are somewhat deceptive, as the following table shows. 
lFCc, "Third Survey of Post-Freeze Television Stations," Public 
Notice-23055 (August 19, 1955). 
2Ibid. 
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TiL3LE 6 
POST-FREEZE TV STJ•TIONS WIT".tl CONTINUI;{G i'JC)JTHLY LOSSES 
DURING PERIOD JANUARY - OCTOBER 1954 
Average Honthly Loss During 
Ten Month Period 
Under $5,ooo .........•.. 
~5,000 - ~10,000 •.••••..••.. 
$10,000- $20,000 •••••••••••• 
OVer $20 1 000 •••••••••••• 
Totals: 
Hedian Monthly Loss: 
7 
18 
12 
-.JL 
41 
:S8, 750 
UHF 
14 
23 
12 
___.2_ 
58 
:\)8,260 
Total (VHF & Ufl') 
21 
41 
24 
..1]_ 
99 
~8,460 
Source: FCC, "Third Survey of Post-Freeze Television Stations," 
Public :~otice 23055 {August 19, 1955), Table J.A. 
1'he Importance of Network Affiliation.- Of the 143 VHF stations 
reported in the Commission's third survey, 101 (70 per cent) carried com-
mercial programs of the Columbia Broadcasting Syst.em or the National Broad-
casting Company, or both, in excess of' seven and one-half hours per week.1 
Eighty-two per cent of the 101 stations were either profitable overall or 
were achieving profits by October 1954. Of the forty-two VIJF stations with 
fewer than seven and one-half hours of the major networks' programs, forty-
five per cent \'lere either operating profitably or were nearing a profitable 
operation by October 1954. Of the 101 vhF stations carrying seven and one-
half hours of network programming, sixty-four (63 per cent) had average 
monthly revenues above $30,000. Only three of the 101 stations earned less 
lFCC figures in tl1is instance were based on the week of October 10, 
1954. See FCC, "Third Survey of Post-Freeze Television Stations," Public 
Notice 23055 {August 19, 1955), Table 5. 
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than $10,000 monthly. 
With regard to UHF stations, -ohirty-one of the forty-two carrying 
network programs in excess of seven and one-half hours earned monthly 
l 
revenues above $2u,ooo. Eighteen haa monthly revenues above $30,000, as 
compared with four of the forty-nine other UHF sta-oions which presumably 
carried fewer than seven and one-half hours of network programming or none 
at all. Eleven of the forty-two stations carrying more than seven and one-
half hours of network programming earned $101 000 or less. Forty of the 
"other" UHF stations earned less than $201 000, with twenty-six earning less 
than $101 000 monthly. In other words, the grea-oer proportion of UHF sta-
tiona earning proi'its were affiliatea with one or both of the major net-
works. 
Investment Costs: Comparative Figures.- In 1954, the Commission 
tabulated figures which compared the original cost of post-freeze televi-
sion stations. 2 The figures showed that ninety-six out of 100 UHF stations 
had invested from $1U0 1 000 to $60o,OOO in tangible broadCast property; for 
VHF stations, the total was ninety-seven out of 109 stations. The average 
lFcC, "Third Survey of Post-Freeze Television Sta-oions," Public 
Notice 23055 (August 19, 1955), Table 6. 
2FCc, Statistical Appendix, Testimony of Chairman Rosel H. Hyde 
before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce on the Status and Development of' the UHF Channels in the United 
States (May 19, 19;)4) 1 Table 4. The Appendix consists of' 25 mimeographed 
tables. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Status of UID' ana Hultiple Owner-
ship of TV Stations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Conununications of 
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, u.s. Senate, 83d Gong., 
2d Sess., on TRe Status of UHF Television Stations and S. 3095, A Bill to 
Regulate Multiple Ownership of Television Stations, May-June 1954 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1954), PP• 157-173. 
!':-"" 
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cost of a UHF station was $300,493; for a VrlF station, ~376,125. The aggre-
gate cost of 109 VHF stations was approximately $41 million; for 100 UIJF 
stations, approximately $30 million. On the basis of the average cost of 
a UHF station, the UHF property "loss" to UHF owners for thirty-one sta-
tions1 was approximately $9.3 million. 
Statistics for the Period January to December 1957 
In 1957, the Commission reported that only twenty-three UHF sta-
tions which had been operated for the full year had shown profits as 
against 162 post-freeze stations operating at a profit. 2 Forty-eight UHF 
stations showed losses in 1957 as against 109 post-freeze Vl{F stations. 
Of the post-freeze stations which were in operation for only a part of 
1957, only five VID' stations showed a profit. No UHF stations in this 
classification were listed as having shown a profit. However, nine UfJ< 
stations and twenty post-freeze VHF stations in operation for only a part 
of 1957 showed losses. Eleven UHF stations--but only one v1iF station--
suspended operation prior to Dece."'!lber 31, 1957. By the end of 1957, eighty-
eight Uhl' stations were in operation as compared with 302 post-freeze 
VHF stations) 
Principal Expense Items of Television Stations.- The Federal Com-
lrrunications Commission compiled figures for the principal expense items of 
1 Supra, p. W. 
2FCc, "Final TV Broadcast Data--195 7, 11 Public Notice-S 63000 
(August 27, 1958), Table 3. 
3supra, p. 58, Table 5. 
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television stations with $25,000 or more in time sales during 1957.1 The 
statistics indicated that the average annual total expenses for a UHF 
station were ~390,647. For the VnF station, the average total expenses 
were $592,050. Salaries and wages were the biggest i terns in total ex-
penses: for the UHF station, ~146,590; and for the VHF station, *213,014. 
The average cost of film for the l.Jl-IF station was $;37 ,881; for the VHF sta-
tion, $71,732. Talent costs amounted to ::P8,639 for the UHF' station, but 
were $13,204 for the VHF station, VrlF station depreciation costs amounted 
to (1;64,432; for the VtiF station, they were $96,514. "All other costs" 
totaled $133,105 for the UHF station; for the VP~' station, these were 
~il97 ,586. 
How Large Can the U.S. Television System Be? 
Two economists, Peter Levin and Sidney Alexander, attempted an 
analysis of the UHF allocation problem based on market requirements. Both 
attacked the problem from basically different assumptions, but the results 
were the same: the United States could profitably support only 500 to 6oo 
television stations, in clueing UhF. Furthermore, both concluded that the 
operation of U~:F stations was dependent upon the same factors which li-
mited the profits of Vcl}' stations: market characteristics and market po-
tential, 
The Levin Analysis 
Levin used retail sales in a station's city and home county as a 
measure of the ability of a market to support a specified number of tele-
lFCc, "Final TV 3roadcast Data--1957 , 11 Public Notice->3 63000 
(August 27, 19SB), Table 6. Figures cited are those for post-freeze 
stations, 
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vision stations,1 He observed that in 1952 eight of the 108 television 
stations in operation reported .losses, ana the eight were in markets on 
the caliber of New York City and Los Angeles where television saturation 
was high. 2 Saturation aside, however, he concluded that station profits 
depended on the size of the original investment, hours of operation, pro-
gram balance, ana the financial structures of station ana community. 
He stated that potential revenues have been a function of station 
coverage, regional ana local competition, network affiliation, national 
sales representation, volume of business in advertisable goods and services, 
and the size ana number of local businesses capable of paying television 
rates, In smaller markets, for example, where the bulk of station revenues 
came from small accounts, a city with fewer but larger businesses might be 
able to support more stations than a city of larger population ana more, 
but smaller, stores ana businesses, 
Overall, he claimed, a general forecast could be drawn for the 
country as a whole. The forecast was based on the assumption that there 
was a fairly close relationship between consumer spencing ana advertising 
expenditures out of which came the greater portion of television revenues. 
Levin statea that such a relationship existea was evident in the tencency 
of all advertising spenaing to range at approximately four per cent of re-
tail sales. He appliea me figure oi' four per cent to advertising ana pro-
motion in all meaia ana then applied ten per cent of that, or 0,4 per cent, 
1Peter R. Levin, "How Many TV Outlets Can the U.S. Support?" 
ilroaacasting-Telecasting (April 27, 19';>3), pp. 102-108. 'l'he following is 
taken from the article cited, 
2Levin did not give the source of his figures. 
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to television. The figure of ten per cent for television advertising was 
based on the long-term trend of the nation's econo~, inasmuch as the 
United States was increasing its economic power at the compound rate of 
2.5 per cent annually. Thus, he concluded, by average grm.rth within five 
years the nation's econo~ would be thirteen per cent breater than it was 
in 1953. Assuming the normal rate of increase in the American economy, 
all media would prosper. 
3efore listing some 200 markets by size and correlating the theo-
retical nuniber of stations each could support by potential advertising 
revenue, Levin established a very interesting station breakdown. Since 
the type of television station, large or small, was dependent on the size 
anc revenue of the city which could support it and others like it, he pro-
jected three types of stations: 
(1) a small station, costing between :.JolOO,OOO and ~;175,000 in 
equipment and construction,1 dependent on a network anu film or film ex-
elusively for programrrJng, to be operated on a budget as low as wlSO,OOO 
per year and earning a small profit, with progrannning to amount to as much 
as seventy hours per week; 
(2) an average station, costing between ~200,000 and ;;!60,000, 
engaged in simple live studio production as well as network and film pro-
lBenjamin Aaler, president of Adler Electronics, Inc. • testified 
that his company had put into operation KD!Y-TV, Juneau, Alaska, where a 
population of 10,000 was served by channel B. The total cost of equipment 
(excluding a new building, tower, trans1nission line, shipping anc instal-
lation costs, furnishings anc fix~ures) was .,;35,811.80. He testified that 
the extra costs might run as low as :;;,5,000 were TV added to existing AM 
facilities, or as much as ~30,000 to ~100,000 were a new tower and building 
constructed, Television L'1quiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and 
Industry i~itnesses, pp. 472=4Bo. 
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gra.mrning, with operating costs rurming as low as $250 1 000 for fifty hours 
weekly or as high as ii500,000 per year for seventy hours weekly; 
(3) a large station, costing ~.500,000 or more, reserved 
largely to metropolitan areas, with all types of programming to amount to 
ninety hours weekly, with operating costs set at $750,000 or more annually. 
To fit stations into the country's markets, Levin would analyze 
the retail sales of each city with a television allocation and relate these 
to costs of station operation as given above. For example, he took 
;,150,000 as a minimum figure and multiplied this by 250, the reciprocal of 
0.4 per cent. The resulting figure was :W37,50o,ooo, which represented the 
smallest concentration of city retail sales theoretically capable of sup-
porting a television station. For such a station, county retail sales 
would have to be ~50 million in volume. An average-sized station would 
have to be supported by a city with 962.4 million in retail sales and ~85.8 
million in county sales. An average station, or two stations at a future 
date, would have to be supported by a city with ~85.8 retail sales, ~~th 
county sales of ~30 million. 
Two average-sized stations, or three stations at a future date, 
would need the support of a city with retail sales amounting to $150 nal-
lion and county sales of t257, 350,000. Three stations 1<ould have to be 
supported by a city with ;,>257,350,000 in retail sales and ~450 million in 
county sales. 
But, according to Levin, what really counted was the potential 
revenue available in a market and the opportunity and abilit~ of the tele-
vision station management to get that revenue from local merchru1ts and 
national advertisers. Population in the service area of the station, or 
:: 
the cost per thousand, 1 were of less significance. If the naoional adver-
tiser were unwilling to buy the market directly, he would buy it indirectly 
by splitting cooperative funds for advertising wioh a local dealer. As 
long as the station's card rate were placed within his means, the local 
advertiser would pick up the slack in na•ional advertising by showing his 
wares on television. Levin concluded that a minimum of 517 stations could 
succeed in a minimum of 343 markets, although he conceded that a more 
mature television system might make the figures larger than those he pre-
dieted. 
The Alexander Analysis 
Columbia Broadcasting System's economis•, Sidney Alexander, stated 
that the number of television stations which could exist in the United 
States was determined by the abili~ of advertisers to provide revenues 
for television. 2 His thesis was that not more than 600 television stations. 
could be operated successfully under the then current economic conditions3 
and that two-thirds of the roughly 1,800 channels allocated by the Federal 
Communications Commission would remain unused or be occupied by stations 
lrn its simplest form, "cost per thousand" refers to the rate 
charged for time divided by the number of television sets, in the case of 
TV, in the market area in which a station's signal is received. The method 
for computing cost per thousand is more complicated than its explanation 
indicates, entailing as it does program costs, the number of sets tuned 
to a particular program, etc. 
2sidney s. Alexander, "CBS Says u.s. TV Limit IS 6oo Healthy 
Stations," Broadcasting-Telecas•ing, XLIX (October 17, 19~5), pp. 27-31. 
The following account is taken from the article cited. 
3rt is interesting to note that, 3 years after Alexander's state-
ment, 510 commercial stations were on the air as o1 April 1958. See 
"Telestatus, 11 Broadcasting, LIV (April 7, 1958), P• 101. 
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·f" which coulc not possibly make a profit. On the other hand, station opera-
:: 
ting costs might decline and advertising revenues from local sources might 
rise, enabling more stations to be supported. But, for the next few years 
(and Alexander did not specify the number), 6oo stations and satellites 
would be the outside maximum. His estimates were high, he believed, be-
cause 95 to 97 per cent of the nation's families already lived in areas 
which could be served economically by television. 
Levin based his assumptions on market revenues. Alexander, on the 
other hand, based his assumptions on potential station revenue, or what a 
station must earn to meet its expenses and to operate at a profit. The 
minimum revenue for a one-station market would have to be ~25,000 a month, 
or $300,000 per year. He pointed out that eight unprofitable UHF stations 
had an average income of $19,500 a month. Therefore, in order to increase 
the difference between operating costs and revenue, a station woulri have to 
increase its volume of business to exist profitably. 
For a two-station market, the minimum level of revenue which would 
allow a station to operate at a profit would have to be ~300,000 a year, 
per station. As he pointed out, this would imply that a city such as 
Lincoln, Nebraska, could support two UHF stations; but it could not do so, 
since one of the two suspended operation. For a three-station market, the 
minimum revenue would be ~400,000 or more, per station. A four-station 
market must provide each station with ~500,000 or more for profitable oper-
ation. 
He also estimated the minimum number of television homes for each 
type of market. For a one-station market, 20,000 homes; a two-station 
market, 45,000 homes; a three-station market, 75,000 homes; and a four-
" 
" 
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station market, 125,000 homes. The minimum number of homes required for 
each market, as contrasted with the minimum number of television homes, 
he estimated as follows: for a one-station market, 22,000 homes; for a 
two-station market, 50,000; a three-station market, 83,000; and a four-
station market, 139,000 homes. 
3ummary 
The D1Th' operators' contention that the television broadcasting 
11pie·11 was a large one which could bear smaller cuts1 would appear on the 
surface to be correct. To gain access to television revenues, they have 
urged Congress and the Federal Communications Commission to deintermix 
certain markets and to adopt other measures which would equalize the com-
petitive potential of DnF and VriF stations. The question is, however, 
~1at even were the Commission and Congress to provide competitively equal 
facilities would the measures advocated by the UHF operators also induce 
those with capital to invest in UhF stations and small community stations? 
The foregoing economic statistics provide a partial answer to the 
question. Television revenues were dependent on the amount of money ad-
vertisers were willing to put into television. As was noted, post-freeze 
VHF stations began to earn profits as a group in 1955. That year was also 
the year in which advertisers pumped one billion dollars into television. 
Advertisers were interested in reaching the largest number of con-
sumers at the smallest possible cost. Consequently, as the figures showed, 
they favored those television stations in highly populated areas of the 
country, or the top 100-169 markets. Two hundred ana thirty-one television 
----··:: 
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stations in seventy key markets earned approximately seven times as much as 
248 stations in 207 other markets. In other words, money flowed to those 
areas from which the advertisers could gain their profits. 
The figures shewed that those with capita.!. apparently were unwill-
ing to invest as much money in UHF as they were in VHF. Thirty-one UHF 
stations suspended operation in 1954 as compared with one VHF station. 
Backers of VHF stations were willing to keep afloat VHF stations despite 
the fact that some of them were losing money. In general, the original 
investment cost of UHF stations was lower than that for VHF stations, 
which might also indicate a certain hesitancy on the part of investors to 
sink capital into what might be a losing proposition. 
The Commission 1 s figures showed that certain UHF stations a:ia make 
a profit as early as 19~4. These were stations which carriea network pro-
grams. The Writer suggests that, although the Commission's tabulations 
did not break down these stations by markets, the profitable UHF stations 
were located in rich market areas, or were deliberately nurtured by network 
interest in UHF. 
In the light of the millions of dollars expended by advertisers in 
television and the profits made by certain television stations, one can 
understand the objections of UHF operators to any plans which might limit 
the growth of television. But, as the Commission• s figures indicated, 
television- broadcast income went to a co~arati vely few markets. To re-
state the question put earlier, 1 how widespread a service can television 
become without forcing the government to regulate the economics of the 
l, 64 o;upra, p. • 
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business? And, just how divergent are plans for aiding UHF among the 
various segments of the industry? 
.. 
:: 
CHAP·rBR V 
HDUSTRY PROPOSALS AS .:30LUTIONS TO 
1'H1 UHF PROBLKd 
Hany plans have been submitted to the Feaeral Connnunications Com-
mission as solutions to the allocations problem. Some have been submitted 
by individual station operators and small broadcasting companies. Others 
have come from large companies in the broadcasting industry. In general, 
however, the plans may be broken into three classifications: Deinterroix-
ture, VliF drop-ins on eXisting VHF channels, 1 and new VHF channels to be 
obtained from whatever source possible. 
As we have seen, UH~ station owners advocated deinterntixture in 
lieu of shifting television broadcasting entirely into the UhF portion of 
2 
the spectrum. Some V}IF operators, fearful of being ousted from VHJ'' in 
favor of UhF, have opposed deinterroixture3 and tacitly supported an all-\~F 
system. Other plans, such as the Columbia Broadcasting System's proposals, 
have given lip-service to deintermixture but in reality have outlined an 
all-VHF system for the Commission's consideration. Because the actions of 
these large companies have carried so much weight within the industry, as 
well as without, this chapter will deal with some of the suggested solutions 
lThe term "drop-ins" covered a multiplicity of engineering plans 
submitted to the FCC as solutions to the allocation problem. The plans in 
effect would reduce the FCC's minimum city-to-city mileage separation re-
quirements for VHF channel assignments; and, in some instances, even the 
minimum requirements for transmitter spacings in order to expand use of 
the twelve VHF channels for television broadcasting. 
2supra, pp. 46, 50. 
3Television In~uir~ (1956), 
dustry o'Jitnesses, pp.66- 74. 
Part II, Testimony of Public and In-
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to thA allocations problem made by a few of the companies during the 1956 
Senate television hearings. 
Proposals Made by the Columbia Broadcasting System 
In brief, the Columbia Broadcasting System proposed two plans. 
Plan I involved a total of thirty-seven new VliF assignments to thirty-one 
markets. It proposed twenty-six drop-ins of VHF stations; an additional 
seven stations would be moved fran smaller comnrunities to larger adjacent 
communi ties; and four unapplied for channel.swould be shifted to markets 
which could use them.1 The network estimated that Plan I would increase 
the number of television stations within the leading 100 markets by 60 per 
cent. 2 
Plan II involved the use of Plan I and three additional channels. 3 
The three additional channels were to be procured from whatever source the 
Federal Communications Commission could obtain them. In any event, Plan 
II would provide three or more channels in each of the 100 leading markets. 
Four more VHF channels, making seven in all, would be sufficient to meet 
the needs of local "community" stations and would provide the long-run 
solution to the allocations problem. 
Commenting on opposition to Plans I and II, the n etwork 1 s repre-
sentative remarked that one witness had described them as "monopoly 
. 
1~., P• 814. 2~., P• 814 • 
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plans"1 and had alleged that under tbe Columbia Broadcasting System's plans 
all those who lived outside the 100 leading television markets would be 
deprived of all television service. The network contended that the critic-
isms were unjustified and that the network's chief motive was to increase 
competition in the leading markets, at the same time improving the pros-
pects for te.l.evisicn service outside those ma:rltets. 2 As proof of its in-
terest in other markets, the network cited the fact that it had affilia-
tion with television stations in 178 markets. The television stations were 
located not only in such large markets as New York, Detroit, and Philadel-
phia--but also in Grand Junction, Colorado, and Twin Falls, Idaho, with 
5,300 and 6,300 families respectively. 'The network believed that, although 
Plans I and II were concerned with 1he assignment of three or more televi-
sion stations in the top 100 markets, the refinement on Plan II might give 
one or two stations to markets other than the top 100.3 
Proposals Made By the American Broadcasting Company 
As with the Columbia Broadcasting System, the ftJnerican Broadcasting 
Company was concerned with allocation revisions in the major markets. The 
American Broadcasting Company's recommendations were limited to those 
libid., pp. 814-815. The witness was Philip Merryman who repre-
sented the-committee for Hometown Television, Inc., during the 1956 Senate 
television hearings. There was no doubt that Merryman intimated that CBS' 
.Hans I and II were monopoly plans. Furthermore, Merryman stated: "If 
you live inside one of the squares, you are presumed to get a signal - I 
guess you probably would. On the other hane!, if you live in one of these 
white areas, you don't get any TV •••• The term 'white areas• may be exactly 
translated as rural coverage •••• So the plain fact is that under the most 
extreme plan yet advanced for 1he use of wide-coverage stations we will get 
only nominal rural coverage •••• 11 Television Inquiry (l95c), Part II, Testi-
mony of Public and Industry Witnesses, PP• 464-465. 
2~ •• pp. 81.4-816 • 3supra, p. 74. 
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changes necessary to achieve competitive, three-station service in the 
major markets; to avoid disturbing eXisting UHF stations; and to permit 
the revival of UHF stations which had been forced to suspend operation.1 
The network's proposal was based on a combination of three-principles: 
deintermixture to create homogeneous UHF or VHF markets; drop-ins of VHF 
channels with engineering safeguards to protect the quality of existing 
services; and the use of some VHF channels, unused but assigned to educa-
tion. 2 
With regard to the use of educational channels, the network• s 
representative pointed out that only ten VHF channels had been allocated 
for use in the top twenty markets. 3 The network therefore concluded that 
there could be no educational television system of a national nature with-
f"'\, out UHF. It reasoned that the use of those VHF channels which were "gather-
ing dust114 would contribute to the growth end survival of UHF. The network 
assumed that if its proposals were aoopted UHF broadcasting would grow and 
educators could then safely enter the UHF field. 
1lbid., P• 773. 2~., P• 777. 
4Ibid., p. 778. ABC's representative testified before the Senate 
Interstateana Foreign Conunerce Committee on March 26, 1956. On February 
291 1956, however, Ralph Steetle, Executive Director of the Joint Council 
on Educational Television, testified concerning the extent to which educa-
tors had already made use of reserved channels. Seven of the ten VHF chan-
nels reserved for use in the 1Dp 100 markets alreaa.y were operative at the 
time of his testimony. Three others would be operative by the end of 1956. 
Of the 172 UHF channels given to educators, only 4 were then in use: Cin-
cinnati, Columbus, Madison, ana Detroit. Steetle believed that if the FCC 
took action to preserve UHF the reserved UHF channel.s al.so would be used. 
However, if the unused VHF channels were taken from educators, he believed 
that only 6-7 new channels would be the most the top 100 markets would gain-
a gain too small to solve the problem either for commercial or educational. 
operators. Television Inquiry (1956), Part II, Testimony of Public and 
Inaustry Witnesses, PP• 534-535,539. 
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Proposals Made by the Radio Corpora"ion of America and 
the National Broadcasting Company 
The proposals of the Radio Corpora"ion of America and the Na"ional 
Broadcasting Company were almost exactly worded, 1 For the purpose of com-
parison with the two other networks, the suggestions of the National Broad-
casting Company are considered to be more important to this thesis. Of the 
three networks, the National Broadcasting Company's solution to the allo-
cation problem contained by far the least radical features, 'fhe network 
believed that the seventy UHF channels, toge"her with "he twelve Vf!F chan-
ne.Ls, offered the best prospect for encouraging the developmen" of "elevi-
sion as a na"ionwide competitive service, 2 
The network's representa"ive stated tna" any proposals made to al-
leviate the alloca"ion problem should be studied for the long-range impli-
cations of the issues involved, There were, however, actions which both 
Congress and the Federal Communica"ions Commission could take immediately 
to realize the potential of UHF. For Congress, the network suggested: 
Declare as national policy the goal of maintaining 
ana strengthening the UHF service, in order to encourage the 
continued development of television on a nationwide competi-
tive basis, 
In aid oi' this policy, repeal the excise tax on all-
channel color receivers. This would progressively relieve the 
circulation handicap whichhas been the greatest single draw-
back to UHF development. 
In order to facili ~te a Commission policy oi" deinter-
mixture in implementation of this policy, the Commission should 
be in a position to permit the holder o1· a VHF grant to receive, 
without further proceedings, a grant for a substi"uted UHF 
channel resulting from deintermixture. If the Commission be-
lieves there is substantial question of its authority to follow 
such a course, Congress shoula enact the necessary legislation.3 
1Ibid., PP• 693-696. 2Ibid., P• 844. 3Ibid., P• 845. 
:: 
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The Commission could: 
Deintermix on a sufficiently broad basis to create a nucleus 
of predominately Uill' serv:ice areas from which Uhl!' may grow and ex-
pand. 
l:ncourage multiple owners with resources and know-how to 
unoertake the operation of UHF' station in intermixed markets. 
;o;ncourage other qualified persons to unaertake UHF oper-
ations in such markets. 
Permit lJ1JJ!' stations to ase directional antennas. 
Permit 1J1JJ!' stations to use on-channel boosters and trans-
lators to more nearly equalize coverage with their VliF competitors. 
Permit UhF stations to use 5 megawatts of power as an addi-
tional means to improve their competitive position with VHE' •1 
The two other networks haa m·ged the engineering of drop-in sta-
tions. The National Broadcasting Company, on ohe other hand, felt that 
this suggestion had no merit. The network advanced three reasons why it 
believed that drop-in channels should not be considered. 2 One, even if 
several VHF channels could be obtained through drop-ins, such channels 
would fall short of the number needed to provide at least three stations 
in the first 140 markets. Two, the drop-in channels would pose a new con-
version problem for the public. Three, the industry would become pre-
occupied with the question of how and wnere to use the drop-in channels 
to the detriment of U\iP s growth. 
Proposals Hade by the General Electric Company 
'rhe General J>lectric Company's position in the allocations problem 
was a cautious one. The company offered no plans as such, nor did it make 
specii'ic suggestions for the immediate solution of the uHF problem. The 
company confined itself to urging a thorough, objective study of the UHF 
problem. The company believed that such a study would 
1~., P• 846. P• 859 • 
" 
.. 
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(1) offer the solution most likely to produce the fewest 
continuing conflicts in the constant struggle for space in the 
spectrum; 
(2) enable equipment ma."lufacturers to concentrate on ac-
celerating the development and production of advanced design 
transmitters and UHF/VHl' receivers; 
(3) provide a fundamental, long-term solution to the over-
all allocations problem; 
(4) provide room for one or two additional networks; 
(5) facilitate long-range future expansion.l 
Proposals Hade by the Raciio-Electronics-1'elevision 
Nanufacturers Association 
llliTEA' s position during the 1956 Senate television hearings was 
that the allocation plan as presented in the Sixth Heport and Orner was 
basically sound. 2 RE1'i"•iA ciid not offer a plan llhich might aid UHF. The 
only specific suggestion made by the Association was that the excise tax 
on television receivers be eliminated. If this were done, RETI~ believed 
that the action might induce receiver manufacturers to produce all-channel 
sets, which in turn would encourage the investment of capital in Uill' sta-
tions.3 
Far more significant than the lack or possible solution to the allo-
cations problem was the testimony given by RETMA 1 s president, H. Leslie 
Hoffman, with regard to monopoly. Summing up the Association's position in 
the allocations question, Hoffman dismissed as absurd the implication that 
2Ibid., PP• 723-724. 3Ibid., PP• 724-725. 
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some manufacturers, or the industry as a whole, were engaged in a con-
spiracy to stifle UHF.1 His rebuttal to the implications may be summed 
up by the following points: 
(1) The ratio of UHF or all-channel television receivers 
to total TV set production is determined by public demand and is 
closely related to the ratio of UHF to VHF broadcasting services. 
(2) The cost of all-channel TV sets is higher than that of 
VHF-only sets, because of certain more expensive components and a 
smaller production volume. 
(3) The only practical means of equalizing the sales prices 
of all-channel receivers and VHF sets is to remove the 10-per cent 
excise tax on UHF-VHF receivers. 
(4) Manufacturers of television receivers, like other pro-
ducers, are i~ business to make a profit and dividends for their 
stockholders. 
Sunnnary 
The striking fact about the concerns cited above was their agree-
ment with UHF operators. In the matter of excise tax relief, higher power 
for UHF stations, directional antennas, the use of booster and translator 
stations, and in the matter of deintermixture, both the UHF operators and 
the large concerns in general appeared to agree. To UHF operators, however, 
there has been a definite line of distinction separating their advocacy of 
such proposals and that of the large concerns. The distinction has lain in 
the use to which the proposals would be put. For example, UID' operators 
have opposed the authorization of booster and translator stations to VHF 
operators.3 Their reasoning has been that the use of such aids by VHF 
stations would only enlarge the coverage areas of the more naturally en-
dowed sta"tions. 
The testimony of the Committee for Hometown Television ana the UHF 
Industry Coordinating Committee showed some divergence in points of view. 
1Ibid., PP• 715-716. 2Ib .. ~·, P• 3supra, pp. 38, 50. 
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So it has been with the larger concerns, Although in agreement that some-
thing should be done to solTe the allocations problem as quickly as pos-
sible, the Columbia Broadcasting Sys•em, the American Broadcasting Company 
and the National Broadcasting Company have shown decided differences in 
their proposed solutions to the UHF problem. Of the three networks, the 
Columbia Broadcasting System and the American Broactcas•ing Company were 
more in agreement. Both frankly placed stress on some means to extend 
competitive facilities in the top 100 markets of the United States. 
With some justification for the Columbia Broadcasting System's 
plans, they did recognize the fact that the greater proportion of the 
nation's population has been located within a relatively small area in the 
eastern half of the country. The plans and testimony given during the 
1956 Senate television hearings also recognized the fact that the smaller 
stations in this highly populated area, particularly the UHF stations, 
suffered from the encroachments of the larger stations in their coverage 
areas, By proposing the VrlF replace UHF in this highly concentrated area 
and that additional VHF channels be fauna for community stations, the Col-
umbia Broadcasting System nonetheless seemed to have overlooked the fact 
that one of the bases for profits was programming. As this writer observed 
earlier, UHF station owners were truly concerned about VHF infringement in 
their service areas, but these station owners also seemed to believe that 
a network affiliation was essential to them.1 By delineating market areas, 
although emphasizing that it had affiliates in other than the top 100 
markets, the network in effect limited the hopes of these smaller stations 
ti2 
jl :; 
:: that they could eventually become a network affiliate were either of the 
Columbia Broadcasting System's plans adopted. Nor did the network really 
I! p 
jl 
solve the problem of the large television station overshadowing the smaller 
in making a distinction, through its plans, between the large-market sta-
tion and the smaller community station. Finally, the Columbia Broadcast-
ing System laid itself wide open to specific charges of intent to monopo-
lize the television broadcasting industry by basing its plans on the 
"economics" of the industry as the network interpreted them.1 
The American Broadcasting Company's proposals were frank: that 
network wanted an entry into the top 100 markets on a basis equal to that 
of tne two other networks. What was so startling about the American Broad-' 
casting Company's proposal, however, was that feature which frankly advo-
cated that educators relinquish reserved Vr:.F channels. Neither of the two 
other networks suggested that channels be obtained from those reserved by 
the Federal Communications Commission for educational purposes, although 
the Columbia Broadcasting System had suggesteci that the Commission obtain 
additional vl-!F channels from whatever sources possible. 
Finally, although Hoffman pointed out that there had been some 
suggestion that the entire industry had attempted to stifle UHF, 2 the 
questions ana answers given during the 1956 Senate television hearings 
on the allocations problem clearly indicated that the main burden of the 
lu.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and F'oreign Com;-
merce, The Network Honopoly, A Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee, 
by Senator John vi. Bricker (Committee Print), 84th Gong., 2d Scss. (Wash- l 
ington: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 20-21. This report has been: 
referred to by some as the "Bricker Report. 11 '1 
2Supra, pp. 79-80. 
ll 
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accusation fell on the networks. What struck one who read the testimony 
was the defensive stand of the networks in the face of the implication--
and their unity, despite divergent solutions to the allocations problem. 
CHAPTER VI 
Th:t; lJE1'WCRKS ACID Till>: UlfF PROBLEl'i 
Among the criticisms directed against the major metworks have been 
t1vo which have resulted from the ·UHF problem: (1) the networks have dis-
criminated against UHF stations;1 and (2) they allegedly have been unwill-
ing to affiliate with stations in relatively unduplicated but small com-
. t" 2 mun1. J.es. In reality, the latter criticism pertained to both the small 
UHF and VHF station, Both criticisms have been voiced since the 1954 con-
gressional hearings on the problem of UP~' survival. Largely as a result 
of congressional and Federal Communications Commission concern about the 
UHF situation, two networks were persuaded to do something which would 
bring the benefits of network programming to certain small stations, in-
cluding UHF stations,3 
The two larger networks, the Columbia Broadcasting System and the 
National Broadcasting Company, inaugurated four plans to aid DliF and small 
comr1unity stations. 'l'hese were the Columbia Broadcasting System's ilictended 
Harket Plan (iliP), the National Broadcasting Company's Program ilictension 
Plan (PEP), the National Broadcasting Company's Program Service Plan (PSP), 
and the Columbia Broadcasting System's ilictended Service Plan (ESP). 
:me's Program Service Plan 
In September 1954, the National Broadcasting Company offered its 
! Progra>n Service Plan to make NBC-sponsored programs available to stations 
liietw·ork Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297, p. 220. 
2Ibid.' "' 226. Jrhid., PP• 228-229. 
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which desired to broaacast the programs but haa not been oraered by the 
sponsors.1 The uaordered stations carrying the programs deleted the net-
work commercials. Where contract and production considerations permitted, 
however, the National Broadcasting Company allowed the stations to sell 
local or national spot advertisements in place of those normaLly occupied 
by the network commercials. The National Broadcasting Company had estab-
lished two considerations for station eligibility: one was that the network 
would not :incur any expense to itself in furnishing the programs to the 
• 
stations; and the other, that the total effective coverage area served by 
the ordered ana unordered stations should not exceed 15 per cent of the 
homes (not television homes) served by the oraered station carrying the 
programs. 
CBS's Extended Market Plan 
In December 1954, the Columbia Broadcasting System initiatea its 
Extended Market Plan to permit affiliation with stations in smaller mar-
kets and to encourage additional network sales of such stations. For 
these extended Market Plan stations, the Columbia Broadcasting System gaTe 
up its minimum requirements of 40,000 television family circulation and a 
class A hourly rate of $15o.2 Stations in smaller markets were priced at 
rates as low as $50 per hour in order to bring down the cost per thousand. 
The network also offered special discount rates to advertisers using the 
stations in sufficient volume. All discounts were borne by the Columbia 
Broadcasting System ana the network employed a salesman to work exclusively 
on obtaining orders for Extendea Market Plan stations. Special discount 
rates devised by the network are shown in the following table. 
:;_-
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TABLE 7 
CBS EXTE!-JDED 111\RKET PLAN DISCOUNT EATES 
Discount Rate 
Ro discou.nt .........•.......••.....••..• 
5 per cent •...•.•.....•................. 
'7-1/2 per cent •••••••.••.•.••.•.•••••••. 
10 per cent ............................ . 
15 per cent ••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••• 
El·lP Station - Usage 
Less than 5 stations 
5 to 9 stations 
10 to 14 stations 
15 to 19 stations 
20 or more stations 
Source: Network Broadcasting (1958), "• Report Xo. 1297, p. 229. 
The Columbia Broadcasting System reported that as of Earch 1, 1956, 
the number of regular network advertisers using the plar had increased from 
thirty to forty-seven.l The number of :i::xtended harket Plan stations on the 
air in the United States had increased from thirteen to twenty-five, seven 
of which were Ui'.F stations. 2 Columbia Broadcasting estimated the average 
network payment to :i::xtended Earket Plan stations at approximately ;;;,860 a 
month per station in 1956,3 a figure which increased to approximately 
~1,000 per month in 1957.4 
CBS's Extended Service Plan 
In April 1955, the Columbia Broadcasting System instituted another 
plan, its Extended Service Plan, which was similar to the National Broad-
lrelevision Inquiry (1956), Part IV, l!etwork Practices, p. 1782. 
3rbid. 
4Network Broadcasting (1958), n. Report No. 1297, p. 229. 
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casting Company's Program Service Plan outlined earlier.1 '.!'he Columbia 
Broadcasting System's Lxtended Service Plan was designed to give sponsored 
program service to unordered stations. Unlike the National Broadcasting 
Company's arrangements, however, stations were not permitted to sell par-
ticipation in program to local or national spot advertisers. 2 They were 
free, however, to sell announcements before and after the programs. 
Columbia Broadcasting's Extended Service Plan stations were re-
quired to carry the progr~~ in the same time period as the ordered station 
in the same geographic area. If programs were carried live, the network 
bore ~~e line costs; but if a television recorriing were required, the net-
work charged a minimum rate of five dollars per recording.3 The network 
decided that the maximum allowable duplication of programs would be 10 per 
cent of the total potential viewing homes witP~n the service area of the 
affiliate carrying the program on a regular basis.4 As of January 1, 1957, 
Extended Service Plan stations totaled forty-seven; of ~1ese twenty-six had 
a circulation of less than 40,000 television faroilies.5 
~~C's Program bxtension Plan 
The National Broadcasting Company's Program 1xtension Plan, ini-
tiated in October 1955, was similar to the Columbia Broadcasting bystem's 
1xtended l'iarket Plan in that it sought to persuade advertisers to buy 
lsupra, PP• 84-85. 
2Network Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297, P• 231. 
3rbid. 4Ibid., P• 232. 
5rbid., P• 232. 
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additional stations. 1 Unlike the Columbia Broadca~ting vystem's plan, 
however, the Prograrr, Extension Plan was not desiEned to extGnc! affilia·oion 
with the network. 2 Also in contrast with Columbia Broadcasting's Extended 
l•larket Plan, the National Broaccasting Company Cia not require a station to 
reduce its ho•,trly rate below :WlOO. ii.ach station, however, was required to 
forego any rate increase for one year. 1'he l-rogrcuo .:.Xtension Plan lm·Iered 
the cost per t11ousana of smaller stations by a divicend plan shown in the 
following table. 
TABLE 8 
NBC PFOGR/JfJ EXTENSION PLAI1 DIVID&\fD F.ATES 
Aggregate Class A Hourly 
Rate of p;;p Stations 
Furchased by Advertisers 
Less than ~sl, 500 • •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
~;:.1,500 to 2,249 ......•...•.......••.......... 
* .. 2,250 to 2,95:) •.....•.•...•..... • • • • • • • • • • • • 
~; 3, 000 and over • ............•................ 
Dividend Earned 
(% of Purchase) 
No dividend 
50 
75 
1001 
lBy ordering stations with gross rates aggregating one-half of the 
total in the group, the advertiser gets the other half without charge - a 
dividend of 100 per cent. 
3ource: Network Broadcasting (1958), H. RE-port No. 129'1, p. 230. 
Another unique feature of the National Broadcasting Company's Pro-
gram Extension Plan was th6 sales policy which required that advertisers 
with programs broadc~st between 5-11 p.m. on weekdays ana 'I-ll p.m. on 
Saturdays and Suncays order at lee.st 100 stations for these programs. As of 
lsupra, p. 85. 
2lJ£twork Broadc2.stin~ ( 1958), H. F.eport No. 1297, PP• 229-230. 
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January l, 195 7, the National Broadcasting Comrany had fifty affiliates 
listed in the Program l\x"t.ension Plan group.1 All but twelve advertisers 
affected by the plan were ordering 100 or more stations. Those orderiv~ 
less than 100 stations in the time periods prescribed b, the network had a 
choice of (1) ordering additional stations; (2) permitting their programs 
to be made available to stations they had not ordered, but at no additional 
cost to the advertisers; or (3) taking a reduction in discount. 2 The Pro-
gram Extension Plan station's average monthly earnings in network compen-
sation amounted to slightly less than $1,000,3 
Discussion 
The two networks experienced a great deal of difficulty in obtain-
ing the permission of advertisers and production personnel concerned to 
make programs available to small stations and unwanted UilF stations through 
the NBC Program Service Plan anci the CBS l\xtended Plan. 4 Advertisers had 
been concerned that potential viewers might tl.Ule into stations carrying the 
program without commercials instead of viewing the station carrying the pro-
gram with co"llllercials. Talent and production personnel involved had been 
concerned that, if unordered stations were permitted to carry the programs, 
the networks' policies might kill the possibility of syndicating the pro-
grams in those rnarkets at a later date. Advertising agencies had even gone 
so far as to recorr~end to their clients that they refuse to allow the net-
1~., P• 230, 
2Television Inquiry (1956), Part IV, Network Practices, P• 2353. 
~~etwork Broadcasting (1958), H. Report ~o. 1297, P• 230. 
4Ibid,, PP• 231, 232. 
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works to make programs available on an unordered basis. Both networks, 
however, continued to press advertisers to make programs available to liHF 
and small stations. 
Although aiding small stations, which included UHF stations, to 
the point of forcing advertisers to supply those stations with programs by 
one means or another, the networks nonetheless have evaluated UHF stations 
in business terms, just as have advertisers and their agencies, 1 The Net-
work Study Staff cited the following memorandum as the typical view of the 
networks with regard to UHF stations: 
I am not disturbed about dropping [the UHF' station] in favor 
of [the VHF station] provided that the competitive coverage figures 
warrant it. *** Unless the coverage of the two stations is sub-
stantially equal (both in terms of signal and in terms of conver-
sion) or unless the added coverage of [the VHF] is largely dupli-
cating, I believe that so long as we are in a competitive business, 
we must get the best affiliation we can and that no real purpose 
is served in subsidizing a UHF station by artificial respiration, 
Only where the gap between a potential UHF' and VHF station 
is reasonably small can I justify favoring UHF where we have a 
choice,2 
The Network Study Staff believed that as the UHF situation de-
veloped, it became obvious that the two major networks hac 11 only limited 
need for UHF stations,n3 The Staff went on to report that as of March 31, 
1957, of thirty-three UHF stations affiliated with the National Broadcast-
ing Company, seven were in basic or "must buy" markets. Of the three in-
termixed markets, deintermixture hac been proposed in two (Fresno, Cali-
fornia, and Norfolk, Virginia), while in the third the station had since 
suspended operation.4 
libid., P• 225. 2Ibid., p. 224, 3Ibid., P• 225, 
4Ibid., p. 225. 
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As of the same date, the Columbia Breiadcasting .System listed 
twenty-nine UHF stations as affiliates, including three basics. Of these, 
two were owned by the network; the third was in Albany, a market to which 
the Federal Communications Commission had proposed the addition of a VHF 
station.1 J\lso significant to the Network Study Staff was the fact that 
there were only four UHF stations operating in the top twenty-five markets; 
and twelve, in the top fifty markets. The Staff concluded that in eighty 
of the top 100 markets, it appeared that there would be at least two 1/rlB' 
stations within the next two or three years, practically assuring the 
National Broadcasting Company and the Columbia Broadcasting System of a 
VHF outlet in each of the markets. 2 
The Network Study Staff concluded that the limited development of 
lJ1iF had advantages for the two leading networks because competition between 
these networks and other networks and non-network sources was restricted.) 
The American Broadcasting Colll>any, the Staff observed, had been handi-
capped by the shortage of competitive stations, and DuEont had been forced 
to withdraw from the network field because of the shortage of outlets.4 
The growth of new networks also had been retarded by the lack of competi-
tive facilities, while distributors of syndicated and featured films had 
been "severely handicapped because of station shortages. 11 .5 
Illustrative of the points made by the Staff in the preceding para-
1Ibid., P• 225. As of January 1957, ABC hao affiliated with 
twenty-four UP.F stations. See 11 Telestatus, 11 Broadcasting-Telecasting 
(January '7, 1957), PP• 107-113. 
2Network l:lroadcasting (195b), H. Report No. 1297, P• 225. 
3Ibid. 4rbid. 5rbid. 
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graph was the testimony given by Richard A. Moore, president of KTTV, In-
corporated, an independent VHF station operaoing in Los Angeles, California. 
In an elaborate statement presented to the Senate Interstaoe and Foreign 
Commerce Committee during the Committee's 1956 hearings on network prac-
tices, Moore charged that the "structure and practices of the television 
industry are similar in all essential respects to the former structure and 
practices of tne motion-picture industry that the Supreme Court ruled in 
1948 to violate the antitrust laws.nl 
Moore testified ohat his station was owned by the Los Angeles 
Times-Mirror Company and Leow's, Incorporated (the parent company of Metro-
Goldwyn-l1ayer) and was one of seven VHF soations in Los Angeles. 2 The 
.station had been affiliated with the Columbia Broadcasoing System and 
DuMont prior to 1954 but since then had been operated as an independent 
station. KTTV relied on "good quality films" for its programming and had 
been broadcasting successfully on thao basis.3 
Moore stated, however, that it had become increasingly difficult 
to obtain good films from independent producers.4 'lhe producers had found 
that they could recover their costs only by national distribution and that 
such distribution could be made only through the networks. He cited several 
cases involving KTTV's efforts to obtain progrmns. 
Early in 1954, Television Pictures of America (an independent film 
company) announced plans to introduce the "Halls of Ivy, 11 starring honald 
1Television Inquiry (1956), Part IV, Network Practices, p. 1521. 
2~., P• 1476. 3Ibid., p. 1477. 4Ibid., P• 1539. 
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Collna.'1.1 KTTV attempted to negotiate for the series but was told by Tele-
vision Fictures that a colllmitment woul<i be needeo for a larger group of 
markets. Z:T~'V then entered into an agreement Hith Television Pictures, 
which com1nitted KTTV to buy the rights for California, Oregon, \fashington, 
ana .~izona. The station took the chance that the series would be sold 
in those markets. The agreements contained an escape clause, however, 
which permitted Television Pictures to cancel the contract if the series 
could be sold to a national advertiser who might prefer to distribute the 
programs through a net1~ork. On the last effective ciay of the escape clause, 
Television Pictures canceled the agreement with K'1'1'V because the film con-
cern had sold the series to national network advertisers. 
In Hay 1955, KTTV made an agreement with Official Films to purchase 
the series entitled, "The Adventures of Robin Hood," starring Richard 
2 Greene. As in the case of "Halls of Ivy," KTTV agreed to buy the rights 
for the entire west coast. Once again, however, the prociucer had insisted 
on an escape clause in the contract. Within two days after the agreement 
had been made, the series was sold to a national advertiser for network 
distribution, and the escape clause was invoked. 
i'Joore pointed out that there was a "great wealth of creative talent 
which lies outside the networks," and tb.is talent went to the networks 
through outside packagers of programs and advertisers. The array of crea-
tive programs cited by Hoare included such non-network pro<iuced shows as 
libid., P• 1539. 
3Ibid., P• 1507. 
2Ibid., PP• 1539-1540. 
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Rin Tin Tin 
The World Series 
The Groucho Marx Show 
Robin Hood 
Four Star Playhouse 
United States Steel Hour 
Ford Thea"ter 
The Lawrence Welk Show 
Wednesday night fightsl 
He stated tha"t, despite the success of such programs, the networks 
had insisted on presenting programs which they owned or produced. He 
questioned the power of choice invested in the networks rather than in the 
"American public.•2 To Moore, it seemed "inescapable that much of the best 
entertainment which could come on television and win public favor is pre-
eluded from doing so because primary control of broadcast time is centered 
in three network companies.n3 
n---~--
Moore concluded that 
(a) Just as the major movie firms procuced or controlled the 
bulk of feature motion pictures, the "three major networks produce or 
control the bulk of feature television programs. 
(b) Just as the major movie firms owned or had affiliation 
agreements with the principal movie theaters throughout the country, 
the network companies own or have affiliation agreements with the 
principal TV stations throughout the country. 
(c) Just as the movie firms pumped their pictures through 
the theaters on a block booking ana blind selling basis (United 
States v. Paramount Pic"tures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131), the network 
companies block book and blind sell their programs through their 
affiliated stations under time option contracts requiring the 
stations to clear the prime viewing hours of the day for network 
programs only. 
(d) Just as the motion picture theater chains illegally 
compelled independentdlstributors to book their weak theaters as a 
condition of booking their strong theaters, to the detriment of the 
independent competitors of the weak theaters in the chain (United 
States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100), the network companies illegally 
compel advertisers to purchase time on a must-buy lis"t tha"t includes 
both strong and weak sta"tions, to the detriment of the independent 
s"tations competing with the weaker ne"twork sta"tions, and o1· adver-
tisers who cannot afford to pay for such a Large package. Further-
more, the must-buy policy is a collective refusal to deal by the 
network company and its affiliates, and is illegal under the rule 
of United States v. First NationaL Pictures, Inc. (282 u.s. 44). 
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(e) Just as tne combined control of the major motion 
picture firms over movies and theaters deprived the independent 
movie producer and the independent theater owner of a fair oppor-
tunity to compete with the major producers and their affiliated 
theater chains (United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra), 
the combined network control over TV programs and stations deprives 
independent TV stations and independent TV program producers of a 
fair opportunity to compete with the major network companies and 
their affiliated stations.l 
Summary 
Moore's charges against the networks ofrered some inaication of 
how serious such charges against the networks have been. The Network 
Study Staff, which covered the same ground as did Moore but in greater 
depth, nonetheless recognized the great contribution the networks have made 
to television. In the Staff's own words, "It was the nationwide, inter-
connected network system of broadcasting, providing free program service 
through advertiser support, which made possible the phenomenal growth of 
television. 112 
The Network Study Staff accepted the network system o1' broadcast-
ing as necessary and highly desirable.3 The Staff believed, however, that 
concentrated control of the networks barred new network entry and competi-
tion.4 The Staff expressed the hope that it would be possible to rely on 
the self-regulating value of publicity in network affiliation practices, 
rates, and compensation. If self-regulation did not foster effective com-
petition, certain changes might have to be made in the television system. 
Among these changes, the Network Study Staff suggested a national televi-
1Ibid., P• 1521. 
2Network Broadcasting (1958), H. rleport No. 1297, P• 663. 
4Ib· ~., P• 665. 
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sion service, much like the press service, made available to all stations; 
a rationing of station time among program suppliers and advertisers; and 
1 Feaeral Communications Commission regulation of rates. 
What Moore's testimony suggested was that networks be broken up in-
to smaller, and equally fierce, competitive units. What Moore did not sug-
gest was a plan for replacing the network system. Moore, in short, advo-
cated mass-produced programs without a switching center which would serve as 
a distributor for programs. This was a view of mass-production wt.ich ap-
pears incongruous to the writer. 
What the Network Study Staff suggested, should public pressure and 
self-regulation fail to bring equal competition within the television syste~ 
was greater governmental control. Yet, there remained the question whether 
more stringent governmental control would foster smaller, more competitively 
equal units. Or would such control merely tend to hasten even greater con-
centration in the hands of a few--perhaps in the government itself? Finally, 
would the Federal Communications Commission be equipped, in its present form, 
to handle the administration of an industry which has been as much creative 
and technical as it has been a business? 
1Ibid., p. 665. 
::_ .~ 
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CHAPTER VII 
TP.E FEDErW:. COi-1-IJNICATIONS COJ-il1ISSION 
General 
Because commercial broadcasting commands so much attention from the 
individual listener and--as can be seen from the preceding pages--from the 
industry, it is not generally recognized that the greater proportion of the 
Federal Communications Commission's work has involved non-broadcast ser-
vices and other matters not directly connected with program broadcasting. 
For example, in 1956 there were some eighty-five radio stations of other 
kinds for every station which broadcast prograrns.l 'I'o illustrate: 
iiater transport is aided by 57,000 stations. 
Air transportation utilizes 49,000 stations. 
Land transportation is facilitated by 26,000 stations. 
Industry is served by 31,000 stations. 
Public protection requires 21,000 stations. 
A.~ateurs operate 150,000 stations. 
Common carrier 11for hire" services use 2,300 stations, 2 
In 1957, the Commission had 1.8 million raaio authorizations on 
its books,3 nhich were 400,000 more than in 1955 and 200,000 more than in 
1956.4 These authorizations covered both non-broadcast and broadcast faci-
lities. 1~e broadcasting industry alone represented a billion dollar 
lThe term "radio" means the transmission by radio of writing, 
signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds, thus including tele-
v~s~on, See u.s. F'ederal Communications Commission, Communications Act of 
1934, as amended (Viashington: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 2 [in 
other reference material, Title I, Sec. 3(b) J. 
2FCC, 1wenty-Second Annual Report, 1956, P• 1. 
3F'CC, Twenty-Third Annual Report, 195'7, P• l. 
4FCC, 1wenty-Second Annual Report, 1956, P• l. 
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business.1 Despite the increased administrative load represented by the 
authorization, the Commission--in addition to the billion dollar broad-
casting industry--administered the twenty billion dollar telephone inoustry 
and the ~333 million telegraph industry.2 
The major activities of the Federal Communications Co!lUil.ission may 
be summarized as follows: 
a. ,<\!locating bands of frequencies to different radio ser-
vices; 
b. Assigning specific frequencies and call signals to L~di­
vidual radio stations; 
c. Licensing and regulating radio stations and radio opera-
tors; 
d. Regulating common carriers engaged in interstate an0 inter-
national co~nunication; 
e. Promoting protection of life ana property through the use 
of racio on the land, on the water, ana in the air; 
f. Encouraging more effective and widespread use of radio; 
and 
g. Helping coordinate wire and radio co"llllunica tions with the 
national defense program.3 
Although the bulk of the Commission 1 s work has entailed non-
broadcast matters,4 the Commission has found itself heavily engaged in 
broadcast matters rising from the scarcity of television channels. 
lFCc, Twenty-Third Annual Report, 1957, P• 131. 
2lbid., P• l. 3Ibid., p. 10. 
4Ibid., Po 5. During 1957, for example, the FCC's field engineer-
ing and monitoring person.~el made 9,300 inspections of radio stations 
(1,100 broadcast, 2,200 ship, ana 6,000 other), resulting in nsarly 4,000 
violation notices (6oO broadcast, l,6oo ship, and 1,800 other). The field 
offices conducted commercial and amateur examinations for operators' li-
censes, resulting in the issuance of approximately 262,000 cormnercial radio 
operator authorizations. The FCC's monitoring network consisting of 16 
stations routinely. Of these bearings, 2,500 were in behalf of lost or 
disabled ships ana aircraft. r,lonitoring stations also handled over 1,300 
major cases, of which 100 involved illegal operations. These comprised 
only a part of the totally different types of operations accomplished by 
the FCC's field monitoring personnel during 1957. 
" 
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Television Broadcast License Procedures 
Although the Commission requested that applications for tel8visicn 
stations not be filed during the "freeze," applications were received. So 
great did the press cf such applications become that the Commission was 
prompted to write: 
Not~dthstanding the Commission's request to interested 
parties not to file applications for ne•r television stations until 
after a final determination had been reached on the issue in the 
pending rulemaldng proceeding, discussed hereinafter, there was a 
steady increase in the number of applications for new TV broadcast 
outlets and at the end of the year 415 such applications were pend-
ing. It appears that in many areas, due to the limited number of 
available cha~nels, comparative hearings ~11 be necessarJ to de-
termine which of the applicants are best qualified to construct and 
operate the requested facilities. 
Kith the lifting of the freeze anci the adoption of the preengineered 
allocation table outlined in the Sixth lieport and Order, the Commission 
adopted a temporary processing procedure to handle the flood of applica-
tions. ThEe procedure, in general, established two pr·ocessing lines. 2 
Group A comprised applications for stations in cities without operating 
television stations: cities located more than forty miles from the nearest 
operating television station. Group B comprised applications for stations 
in cities w~th television stations in operation, or less than forty miles 
from an operating television station. Group B was further subdivided into 
sever·al subgroups with priority offered to communi ties where all the VI1F 
channels were in operation and where only DHF channels >-Jere available. 
lu.s., Federal Co~~unications Commission, Seventeenth Annual Repor~ 
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1951 (Washington: Government l''rinting Office, 
1952), PP• 112-113. 
2u.s., Federal Communications Commission, ~cineteenth Annual Report, 
?iscal Year Bnded June 30, 1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1954), pp. 94-96. Cited hereafter as FCC, Nineteenth Annual Report, 1953. 
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\fithin each group and subgroup, cities were arranged in order of 
population.1 'rhe procedure provided that group A and group B applications 
woulc be processed simultaneously in separate processing lines. The Com-
rdssion published a list of cities arranged in order of the priorities and 
on the basis of the stations on the air at the time the freeze was lifted, 
~!hen television application processing was resumed on July 1, 19.52, 
more than 700 aprlications were on file and many others followed. 2 In 
order to cope with the flood of applications, the Comrdssion staff which 
normally processed the applications was enlarged. Lawyers, engineers, 
accountants, and clerical personnel were drafted from other Comrdssion 
units and given coaching in television processing work. The first group 
of applications was granted on July 12, 1952, when permits were issued for 
eighteen new television stations in various cities. 5y the end of 1953, 
the Comrdssion had become current in the processing of uncontested televi-
sion applications which were in proper form. The major delay in processing 
involved hundreds of competitive cases requiring hearings before the best 
qualified applicants could be determined, 
Hearings 
In 1953, the Commission became concerned about the time consumed, 
the expense to all parties involved, and the size of the written records 
compiled in hearing proceedings,3 Prior to 1953, the Co~nission had allow-
ed informal pre-hearing conferences in which attorneys for rival applicants 
could get together and work out terms by >rhich the formal hearings could be 
reduced to essentials. In February 1953, however, the Commission made the 
libid., P• 95. 2 b". I J.d. I P• 95. 3Ib". ~·J PP• 15-16. 
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pre-hearing conference a part of the actual hearing. In other words, all 
subsequent hearings began vrith a conference. The Commission reported that 
as a result of the move the first such hearing took only four days as com-
pared with the forty to sixty-day hearings for previous post-freeze cases. 
The steps the Commission had taken were laudable, but apparently 
only served to shorten hearings in small measure. In 1955, the Commission 
indicated that the volume of forrrualized paperwork in hearing matters was 
still great.1 For example, as many as 500 exceptions (not including the 
frequent and repetitive motions) had been filed in one television case, 
Consequently, the Commission took other· steps to shorten hearings, These 
steps included refusal to hear repetitious applications; time lirrdts on 
motions to enlarge or change the issues; provisions for the Commission, in 
certain instances, to grant or deny on a basis of written evidence instead 
of oral testimony; and an exchange of written exhibits and information dur-
ing the pre-hearings in order to curtail later oral testimony. 
Despite the fact that Congress had approved Public Law 391 which 
provided that the Commission might deny a protest after oral arg~~ent with-
out full evidentiary hearing, the Commission complained that court decisions 
still required the Commission to hear and determine practically all protests 
made to grants without hearing. 2 'rhis, according to the Commission, only 
bogged down the Commission's processes and delayed new services to the 
l~~c, Twenty-First Annual Report, 1955, pp. 17-lB. 
2FCc, Twenty-1~rd Annual Report, 1957, PP• 7-B. For a discussion 
of UHF operators• views on this subject, supra, PP• 45-46. 
;: 
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public.1 As the Commission noted, the Communications Act of 1934, unlike 
other regulate~- statues, allowed protestants to write their o~m issues 
in such hearings. Some of the issues, the Commission maintained, included 
matters over which the Commission had no control or authority to make de-
cisions. The Commission pointed to the practice of protestants to "inject 
economic issues, especially in broadcast cases, though the Commission is 
without power to protect stations from legitimate competition or guarantee 
them a profit."2 
Personnel Figures 
That the Federal Conununications Commission worked under certain 
handicaps between 1952 and 1957 in the administration of a vast network of 
co~~unications may be indicated by personnel figures. On June 30, 1950, 
for example, the Conrr.ussion reported that a total of 1,265 persons were 
? 
employed, fifty-five fewer than were employed in 1949.~ As of June 1953, 
the Commission employed 1,070 persons, sixty-eight fewer than in 1952 and 
the lowest number since 1940.4 
In 1955, Commission employees numbered 1,094 at the close of the 
lAs late as 1957, highly competitive cases were taking at least a 
year to go through normal application and hearing procedures. See FCC, 
Twenty-Third Annual Report, 1957, P• 8. 
2Ibid., P• 7. There is some doubt that the FCC is without power 
as claimedinthe above statement. See Ad Hoc Report on Allocation of TV 
Channels (1958), PP• 162-184. 
3u.s. Federal Communications Commission, Sixteenth Annual Report, 
Fiscal Year ~nded June 30, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1951), P• 18. 
4Fcc, Nineteenth Annual Report, 1953, P• 14. 
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fiscal year.1 There was a slight upturn in numbers employee as compared 
with 1953, but the figure was fifty-two less than in 1954. In 1956, Com-
mission personnel totaled 1,116 ao the end of the fiscal year. 2 In 1957, 
the personnel figure totaled 1,197 or eighty-one more than in 1956. 3 Field 
engineering, in all instances accountea for approximately one-third the 
total number of employees. 
Problems 
Overloaa of Work 
A comparison between the problems hanaled by the Commission prior 
to World War II and those of today would show that the Feaeral Communica-
tions Commission was forced to hanale an administrative loaa which more 
than doubled in volume and comple.xi ties since World War II. The expansion 
in work brought little corresponaing change in size of soaff or appropria-
tions. Although ios 19~i appropriation was one million dollars more than 
it was in 194'1 1 the Commission was forced to operate with 200 fewer pereons 
on its staff than it had in 1947.4 
-Regulation" of the Commission by Congress ana the Courts 
In addition to those problems noted in the sections on general 
matters, license processing procedures, ana hearings, there was another 
lFcc, Twenty-First Annual R~ort, 1955, P• 16. 
2Fcc, Twenty-Second Annual Report, 1956, p. 15. 
~cc, Twenty-Third Annual R~ort, 1957, p. 20. 
4Ibid., p. 7. In 1957, the FCC spent ~7,825,244. See U.S. Budget 
Bureau, ~ud et of the United States Government, For the Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 1959 Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), 
P• 145. 
;: 
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factor serving to complicate the problems the Commission faced in a growing 
communications system. That is, while the Commission itself regulated the 
communications industry, it was in turn regulated by Congress and the 
courts. Court regulation consisted of judicial review of the Commission's 
decisions.1 Congressional regulation came through legislative supervi-
sion. 
Congressional Regulation.- Carl J. Friedrich and J>velyn Sternberg, 
in their study of Congress and the control of broadcasting, ren~rked that 
the interests of congressmen in their dealings with the Federal Communica-
tions Commission "have been marked out for them by a number of well-
organized pressure groups which represent the Congressman's constituents 
more effectively than they could ever represent themselves." 2 As they 
pointed out, these interests fell into three general groups: control, 
program content, and adequacy of service,3 
Some indication of what Friedrich and Sternberg classified as 
general groups has already been outlined in foregoing chapters. Small 
broadcasters, and their hometown listeners marshalled for congressional 
lFCc, Twenty-Third Annual Report, 1957, p. 7. Ad Hoc Committee 
Chairman Bowles disagreed with the concept that the FCC may be hampered by 
court actions, contending that the courts• review was limited purely to 
correcting errorsof law. See Ad Hoc Report on Allocations of Tf Channels 
(19.58), p. 18.5. 
2carl J. Friedrich and Evelyn Sternberg, "Congress and the Control 
of Radio-Broadcasting, n Studies in the Control of Radio, Prepared by the 
Radio-Broadcasting Research Project at the Littauer Center of Harvard 
University (Harch 1944), P• 509. 
3Friedrich and Sternberg, p. 809. 
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and Commission hearings, expressed fear of the control and monopoly of the 
networks, other chain broadcasters, and "superpower" VliF stations. The 
dissatisfaction of certain independents (for example, K'.rTV 1 s Richard Hoore) 
with program content offered by the networks was aimed at insuring independ-
ent stations' access to programming. But Noore' s testimony was one indica-
tion of the interest in program content brought before Congress, Adequacy 
of VHF service--especially since VHF channels were concentrated in profit-
able markets--was one of the points at issue in the 1956 Senate hearings on 
the UHF-v1IF' allocation problem. All of these issues involved the Commission 
and its policies with respect to television broadcasting. 
A more direct comment on the relationship between Congress and its 
legislative arm, the Federal Communications Commission, was made by Chafee. 
·' Noting congressional antagonism which hindered the Commission's tasks, he 
stated, "Imagine the reception given to the FCC's request for a great in-
crease in its appropriation for the sake of financing an all-out attack on 
the broadcasters whose support will be helpful to congressmen at the next 
election."l It may be noted, however, that it was Congress which granted 
the Commission the funds for the 1957 report on network broadcasting. 
But the congressional antagonism which Chafee noted has been made 
i< evident in ways other than the grant, or non-grant, of funds to the Com-
mission. The Senate Interstate and Foreign Connnerce Committee' a 1956 in-
terim report on the allocations problem blasted the policies the Commission 
had pursued with respect to the~' situation. 2 While approving the Com-
lzechariah Chafee, Jr., Government and J!iass Gommunica tions ( Chicagot 
The University of Chicago Press, 1947), II, p. 587. 
2Television Inquiry: Allocations Phase (1956), 3en. Report ;<)o, 
2769, P• 1. 
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mission 1 s actions intended to alleviate the GH.i' problem, the Senate Com-
mittee nonetheless served notice that it would follow closely the Commis-
sion' s progress and stated that it would call upon the Conmlission for 
"periodic progress reports" with respect to deintermixture and a long 
range shift to UHF •1 
The Commission and the UHF-VHF Problem 
v,!hen the Commission issued the Sixth Report and Order, it was con-
vinced that the UHF bands would be fully utilized and that the UID' stations 
could compete with VH}' stations on a favorable basis. 2 UHF stations were 
to provide a nationwide, competitive television service. 
Five years later, the Conmlission--although citing the record 
growth of television--admitted that a nationwide television service had not 
been achieved.3 It cited the fact that local outlets had not been esta-
blished in many of the smaller communi ties, and the growth of competing ser-
vices in larger markets had not occurred as expected. The Comnlission 
acknowledged the fact that the problems were related to difficulties ex-
perienced in utilizing the seventy UHF channels. But the reasons for the 
failure of UHF to operate successfully in all cases were, according to the 
1 Conmlission, attributable to economic and technical factors beyond the Com-
1 mission's control. 
'"'hat little that was constructive in the Conmlission's thinking was 
summarized in its annual report for 1957. The Conmlission, having considered 
1Ibid., PP• 6-7. 
2Fcc, Sixth Report and Order (April 11, 1952), para. 197, in 
Broadcasting-Telecasting, II, (April 14, 1952). 
3Fcc, Twenty-Third Annual Report, 1957, p. 106. 
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: approximately 500 comments and proposals filling twelve volumes, concluded 
" that the best hope for a long-range solution of the UHF problem would be to 
shift television entirely, or almost entirely, into the ®' portion of the 
spectrum,l In the same breath, the Commission cautioned that before "any 
final determination could be made to use the UHF band exclusively, or in a 
major portion of the United States, further study of the feasibility of the 
proposal, both as to UE.F' 1 s capacity to provide a complete service and as to 
means of minimizing the cost and dislocation both to the public and to in-
dustry during the transition period is necessary ,n2 Interested parties 
were then requested to submit data and comments. 1be Commission mentioned, 
as it had in the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee's 1957 
television hearing, that it had called on the industry to obtain factual 
i information which would assist in determining the "full technical poten-
tiali ties of UHF ,n3 
The Television Allocations Study Organization. 
In response to the Commission's request, the industry had formed in 
January 1957 a body known as the Television Allocations Study Organization, 
which was composed of 132 individuals from sixty-seven organizations repre-
senting a wide cross-section of the television industry.4 The group was 
formed to study the allocations problem under the direction of five basic 
i panels concerned with the following: transmitting equipment, receiving 
equipment, field tests, propagation data, and analysis and theory, Super-
libid., n. 107. 
-- . 
2ill9.., P• 107. 3Ibid,, P• 107, 
4Ibid., PP• 107-108, 
108 
vision and control of the group was theoretically in the hands of the Com-
mission. The Commission had hoped that the information it so sorely needed 
:: would be forthcoming by June 1958. The latest indication was that the 
Study Organization would not have its information ready until sometime 
5' 1 during the fall of 19 o. 
The Commission's Interim Plan 
The Commission concluded that, since it would be a number of years 
' before a long-range plan to reallocate television could be affected, some 
sort of interim plan would be needed. 2 The 11plan 11 consisted of Commission 
attention to those points on which some insistence had been placed by one 
or more groups during the 1956 Senate television inquiry hearings. The 
, Commission, for example, decided to consider deintermixture in thirteen 
selected markets. UHJi'-only roBrkets would be created by the Commission's 
i. decision in the vicinity of Springfield and Peoria, Ulinois; 3 Fresno, 
California; Elmira, New York; anti the Evansville-Hatfield, Indiana, and 
. Owenboro, Kentucky, regions. VF.}' areas would be created in such cities as 
Louisville, Kentucky; St. Louis, Hissouri; Rock Island and Noline, Illinois, 
and Davenport, Iowa; New Orleans, Louisiana; Duluth, dinnesota; and i•liami, 
Florida. 
Certain amendments of the television rules also were made. The 
lucraven' s Approach to TV's Dilemma," Broadcasting, LIV (June 23, 
, l95e), P• 58. Cmr. Craven also reported tha~ the total expense to the in-
dustry for TASO work was between $500,000 and ~650,000. 
2Fcc, 1'wenty-Third Annual Report, 1957, P• 108. 
3The Supreme Court returned the deintermixture cases decided by the 
:FCC to the U.S. Court of Appeals. See 11Did Supreme Court Pull Boner in Re-
manding Deintermixtures?11 Broadcasting, LV (October 27, 1958), PP• 55, 
58-6o. 
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television mileage separation requirements were amended on July 19, 1956.1 
The Commission hoped that by amending minimum spacing requirements addi-
tional service and more effective competition would accrue. As for power 
requirements, the Commission took two steps: it raised the maximum power 
requirements for UHF stations from one million watts to five million watts, 
and it lowered the minimum power requirements for both Uli}" and VHF stations 
from 1,000 watts to 100 watts. 2 The step tc raise maximum power require-
ments was taken to make 1.i1lF coverage more comparable to V1lF. The action to 
lower minimum power requirements was taken to lessen the cost of station 
operation and to encourage small station construction in smaller communi-
ties. 
The Commission was concerned with the lack of small community local 
television outlets but stood firm with regard to the Sixth Report and Or-
der.3 The Commission felt that the preengineered table of allocations 
' provided for a more efficient use of available channels and better protected 
the interests of small communities and rural areas. The Commission also be-
lieved that the Sixth Report's allocation table eliminated disadvantages in 
processing applications. 
In its annual report for 1957, the Commission noted ~~at it had 
taken steps to create "greater opportunity for smaller communities to obtain' 
local TV service" by authorizing satellite stations and reported that nine-
teen satellites (fourteen VHF and five UHF) were on the air by the end of 
lFcc, Twenty-Third Annual Report, 1957, p. 109. 
2rbid., 
August 1, 'i'9Sb. 
June 1955. 
P• 109. Naximum power for UHF stations had been raised on 
Ninimum power limits for both UHF and VHF were lowered in 
3Ibid., PP• 109-llO. 
;j 
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19S7.1 The aut.horization of translat.or, booster, and repeater stations 
were other means used to foster service to small communities and rural 
areas. Boost.er stations, however, were authorized only for UHF st.ations 
in order to improve tneir primary service.2 
The Craven Memorandum 
On May 15, 19S8, Commissioner T.A.M. Craven submitted a memorandum 
on television allocations for a Federal Communicat.ions Commission discus-
sion of policy.3 Craven, an engineer and allocations expert who had served 
with and arouna the Commission for more than thirty years, made it clear in 
his memorandum that the suggestions he made were only "exploratory" in 
nature, and did not constitute firm plans or proposals. Broadcasting, 
however, hailed the memorandum as one which "ended the era of shadow-
boxing with the problem. 114 
In clear, concise terminology, Craven st.ated t.hat the basic problem 
with regard to allocations was not the fault of the Commission which made 
the original allocation.5 The fault, Craven believed, stemmed from the 
rapid development and huge investment in radio space above 100 megacycles 
by the Civil Aeronautics Authority and by the military establishments dur-
ing and following World War II. As he noted, the Government. could not 
libid., PP• llO-lll. 2Ibid., P• lll. 
3"Craven' s Approach to TV's Dilemma," Broadcast.ing, LIV (June 23, 
1958), PP• 56-bO. The material cited in the following account was taken 
from the complet.e memorandum which can be found this issue of Broadcasting. 
4Ibid., P• 56. 
5cmr. Craven was not serving with the FCC at the time the Sixth 
Report was formulated and promulgat.ed. 
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scrap such huge investments merely to accomodate broadcasting. 
According to Craven, however, there were certain steps which the 
Commission could, and should take: (1) immediate "reallocation" of sta-
tions in some of the more important major markets in order to foster com-
petition in those markets;1 (2) short-range improvements to competition 
in the leading 150 markets, a step not to be taken until the Television 
Allocations Study Organization finished its report; and (3) a long-range 
improvement which woulu embrace a radical change in the allocation of radio 
spectrum space to television. 
The unique feature of Craven's memoranuum was contained in his 
suggestions for a long-range allocations policy. He suggested that the 
future allocation of raaio spectrum space for television be made within the 
limits of 174 megacycles to 324 megacycles. This woulu involve the dele-
tion of channels 2-6, leaving channels 7-13 undisturbed, but adding eighteen 
channels beginning at 216 megacycles. The result would be a single block 
of television allocations for twenty-five television channels. 
The twelve megacycles below the 100 megacycle block presently allo-: 
cated to television would be reallocated to services other than television. 
The space between 690-890 megacycles would likewise be reallocated to ser-
vices other than television. Eighteen megacycles of spectrum space below 
the present 100 megacycle television block and the space from the 470 to 
690 megacycles would be allocated by the President for use by the federal 
lwith regard to the immediate steps, Craven advocated that the FCC 
give attention to the American Broadcasting Company, proposals as a basis 
for providing competitive facilities in some of the major mark~s. ABC 
proposed the use of drop-in channels and other unused VHF channels in 
major markets. 
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government in return for the 108 megacycles required by the Commission for 
the i'uture use of television. 
Craven baa no illusions that the plan would be noncontroversial and 
might be labeled impractical, especially by the broadcasters. But at 
• least, as he put it, the plan would be welcomed by users of nonbroadcast 
radio space for needed improvements in their services.l Such a plan, he 
warned, could not be made effective short of seven to ten years. Time 
would be needed to amortize existing investments, provide a transition 
period, ana provide time for tooling up new designs in equipment, as well 
as providing for new investments. Tne only alternative Craven saw was that 
provided by the multiplexing of television channels; ana, with respect to 
multipleXing, more research was necessary. 
Summary 
The use of raoio spectrum space has expanded rapioly in the last 
fifteen years. In reality, broadcast facilities alone have constituted 
but a small part of the total use for which the spectrum has been utilizea. 
l~e Feoeral Communications Commission has haa the task of weighing the im-
portance of the various uses for which the spectrum woulo be utilizea. The 
task of the Commission has been a difficult one. On the one hand, it has 
allocatee raoio frequencies for the use of inaustry, the governmen~and 
the military. On the other hand, it has baa to consiaer the growing use 
oi' frequencies as an entertainment meaium and as a vehicle for advertising. 
All users have asked for the best place in the raaio spectrum, and the "best 
1see "Broadcasters Rally to Hola Off Poachers in TV, FM Frequen-
cies," Broadcasting, LIII (December 2, 19,7), PP• 5o, >2. This was one of 
the few times the broaacasters rallied with unity. 
ll3 
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place" has more often than not been that part of the spectrum which has 
·, been best-developed technically, 
Within this framework of rapid growth and pressures for spectrum 
space, the Commission has worked with a relatively small staff and appro-
priations to regulate not only the radio industry but also the telegraph 
and telephone industries. In the light of these facts, the writer has 
found it difficult to agree on all points with those who have criticized 
the Commission1 for its lack of foresight in anticipating the growth of 
the radio industry, However, with regard to the UP.F-VliF issue, the Com-
mission has laid itself wide open to criticism, 
When the Sixth Report and Order was issued in 1952, the Connnission 
expressed its belief that UHF' stations would provide a nationwide, competi-
i tive television system. ~'rom 1954 to 1955, thirty-one UHF stations sus-
, pended operation at an approximate loss of nine million dollars. Nany 
segments of the broadcasting industry suggested tha.t the Commission act to 
deintermix UHF' markets in order to provide UHF stations with an opportunity 
to grow. The Connnission did nothing until forced by congressional and in-
dustry pressure to act with regard to deintermixture. Furthermore, through-
out this period which should have seen an unbiased study of the allocations 
problem, the Commission asked merely for a study of network practices. 'rhe 
network study, when completed, barely touched the problem of allocations. 
In an issue which was as much technical as economic, this seemed incom-
prehensible. 
One may wonder if the Connnission itself was not fascinated by the 
lAd Hoc Report on Allocation of TV Channels, (195B), pp. 9-15. 
,. 
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i ;; growth of television. 
!' 
On the one hand, the Commission gravely stated that 
the 3ixth Report had engineered an allocations table which would foster 
small community stations. On the other hand, the Commission concentrated 
its attention on a nationwide, competitive oelevision system. Yet, while 
UHF stations failed and small community stations did not appear to take 
hold, the Commission was engaged in handing down decisions which appeared 
to favor VHF stations. '!'he Commission's reasoning was logical on the sur-
face: the allocations table in the 3ixth Report had been preengineered to 
foster competition, to permit the growth of urlE', •nd enable small commu-
nities to have their own television stations. Despite the fact that the 
Commission's objectives were not being realized, the Commission continuea 
to grant channels without a study of the problem, apparently with the hope 
that the situation would somehow solve itself and prove that the policy of 
sticking with the preengineered allocations table had been a correct deci-
sian after all. 
'!'he Commission's policies seemed arbitrary in still another respect. 
!' i! 
The Commission 1 s stress on a competitive television system indica ted an 
interest in the economic side of the industry. Yet, when television station 
operators injected economic issues into the Commission's hearing proce-
dures, the Commission side-stepped the economic issues with the statement 
that it had no p01•Ter to protect stations from legitimate competi tion.1 At 
the same t~~e, the Commission asked Congress for legislation which would 
limit protests in hearing procedures2 --a step whichhampered station oper-
ators from protect~~g their own interests. 
1 dupra, P• 102. 2.:iupra, PP• 45-46. 
:; 
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Certainly, the Commission was not intenaed to be a court of law. 
It has been an agency of Congress, however. As such it has had the power 
to investigate the matters which have come before the Commission. Cutting 
off protests may have speeded up the Co~~ssion's deliberations and pro-
vided a nationwide television service. 3ut might not this action also 
i have blinded the Commission to the other aspects of the objectives it set 
for itself in the Sixth Report and Order? 
" 
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Cll.IU'TER VII 
ANALYSIS At'ID CO;~CLUSION 
The history of television broadcasting, of which the UHF allocation 
problem has been only a part (and an unfinished one at that), has been one 
in which commercial enterprise has developed a powerful interest, mainly 
because its funds have been used in the scientific and commercial develop-
' ment of broadcasting in the United States. But the government itself has 
developed an equally powerful interest in broadcasting because of its im-
pact on the American people and on the economy of the country. 
This interest was fostered in the early days of broadcasting by 
the industry itself, which requested some method of regulation. But the 
industry, growing as it has into large companies, has met with the tradi-
tional Junerican concept with regard to competitive enterprise which on the 
surface has been antipathetic to monopoly, or even the suggestion of it. 
Yet, without the enormous amounts of money, time, and talent which have 
gone into the development of television by such companies as the Radio 
i' Corporation of America, this system of commercial broadcastino, as we !mow 
it today might not have been possible. 
There are some, however, who believe that this corporate enterprise 
has gone the limit in its impact on the American people, and the economy as 
well. The srr~l-town broadcaster, the UHF station operator, the independ-
ent television station operator cut off from sources of progr~~s have, as 
we have seen, decried the "monopolistic" practices of the network companies 
and have been inference linked these companies with manufacturers of broad-
cast equipment and large corporations furnishing common carrier facilities. 
It has been the cry of the little man against the big, unfaced 
,, 
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corporation. 'l'he appeal for protection has been made to the government. 
\'ii th our tradition of almost automatically taking up the cause of the little 
man a;;ainst that of corporate enterprise, it would be easy to give in to 
the impulse to sympathize completely with the 11li ttle man" and to make a 
distinction between black and white. 
The issue, however, is neither black nor white, as is so clearly 
evidenced by the Network Study Staff 1 s report on network broadcasting. 'l'he 
past thirty, perhaps even forty, years have seen an emergence of big busi-
ness, big labor, and big governments. The increased concentration of power 
has been a characteristic not only of our immediate society, but of all 
societies which have stretched toward growth. In the case of the United 
States, and other highly technical societies, the kind of business which 
has ;net the demands of our society has required technical skills and organ-
' ization which can be provided only by large and expensive organizations. 
These organizations usually have ended in corporations, as with the communi-· 
cations industry; or, in some nations, in the hands of the government it-
self. 
vl'i th respect to the broadcasting industry, the question becomes: 
"Do we want unrestricted competition?" As evidenced by the attitudes of the, 
networks, the answer is an obvious "yes." But as evidenced by small station 
owners, independent station operators, and advertisers jockeying for posi-
tion between the large and small segments of the broadcasting industry, the 
answer is only a qualified 11yes. 11 The latter group desires unrestricted 
competitior. protected by the government. 
The danger inherent in both views is one which cannot be ignored. 
On one hand, unrestricted competition which to a degree has ignored the 
ll8 
small broadcaster has led to relentless pressures on the legislative and 
regulatory branches of our government, Those advocating unrestricted 
competition have, in efi'ect, asked the government to declare a choice 
between the small man and the large corporation--this, in an age in which 
the representative government has been faced with pressures from abroad, 
exerted by monolithic governments which have attacked the tenets of the 
enterprise system, 
Pressures for government protection, on the other hand, offer a 
temptation to over-regulate and over-legislate in the interest of compe-
tition to the point of stringent government control. Where that regulatory 
process has been little understood--or little supported by the very groups 
which have asked for support--there has been a temptation on the part of 
the government agency to become arbitrary. This coolld clearly be seen in 
the actions of the Federal CollliiiWlications Commission, understaffed and with 
limited funds, to request legislation which has served to cut off petitions 
and appeals in hearing proceedings. True, the agency itself has fought 
against such arbitrary actions by attempting to effect a just means of dis-
posing of cases. True, the legislative branch of the government has attempt-
ed to act as an arbiter to all groups, including its own regulatory agency. 
!lonetheless, the law to limit the right of petition may be regarded as an 
act of over-regulation and over-legislation. 
With regard to specific points in the allocations question: did 
UHF stations fail because their owners began broadcasting without proper 
knowledge of UHF's limitations? Some did, The industry itself knew rela-
tively little about the total capabilities oi' the l!1fr' portion of the 
f"', spectrum. But, as facts became available, those Uill' licensees who were 
-,-,- -t!--
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able to weather the expensive UHF operation became more knowledgeable 
about UHF propagation effects, as well as the economics of competing with 
the more "stable" VHF stations. There were others, however, who failed--
not because they lacked knowledge about the technical aspects of UHF 
broadcasting but because of many other factors already outlined in this 
thesis, the most prominent of which were advertiser distrust of UHF, the 
vacillating policiesof the Federal Communications Commission, and the flow 
of money to the highly populated major markets. 
Could it be said that the networks and the industry as a whole de-
liberately tried to scuttle the UHF issue with a "let them swim or sink" 
policy? This is a thorny question. In the light of warnings made by many 
segments of the industry about the capabilities of UHF, it would be diffi-
cult to believe that an industry such as the electronics industry--geared 
as it has been to expansion--could be blamed for permitting UHF stations 
to fail in order to guard its own VHF interests. But this scarcely can be 
proved until a body of researchers, such as the Justice Department, has 
investigated the transactions of companies having powerful interests in 
television. 
The closest one can come to admitting that the industry deliberately 
stifled the UHF question has been that evidence given by the Network Study 
Staff in its report on network broadcasting. As already noted, the Staff 
corroborated this view in a statement based on one memorandum circulated 
in one network to the effect that a Vl:iF station was to be preferred over a 
UHF station unless coverage of the latter-type station were comparable to 
that of a VHF station. 
While not endeavoring to defend the networks, one must recognize 
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that of eighty-si.x UHF stations in operation in 19~'1, eighty-three were 
affiliated with the "three major networks.1 True, the number of UHl'' sta-
tions had shrunk considerably since the peak year 1955, but the question 
then became one of responsibility. Were the networks responsible for main-
taining UHF in the face of technical and economic problems encountered by 
the UHF broadcasters? 
The history of the aLlocations hearings indicated that many groups 
thought the networks were responsible 1·or supplying programs, the life-
blood of the television broadcast station. The fact remained that, faced 
with this responsibility, the networks attempted to aid UHl' stations. The 
Net>iOrk Study Staff recognized this in its network broadcasting report. 
Although rightly questioning whether the networks had the right to impose 
their will on advertisers, the Staff nevertheless commended the networks 
for their attempts to make available such programs as they were able to 
force from advertisers. Whether any aid wo·JJ.d have been forthcoming with-
out the pressures of Senate-Federal Communications Commission hearings and 
investigations remains open to question. 
Were the UHF owners led on by the promise of the federal Communi-
cations Commission that they would be protected if they undertook UHF 
broadcasting? No doubt they were. The Federal Communications Commission 
was itself hopeful that the new spectrum would provide the means by which 
television broadcasting would expand ana grow as had radio. Dependent as 
the Commission was on industry reports, which varied as to the reliability 
of the new spectrum and the equipment developed to harness it, the Commie-
lFcc statistics indicated that those UHF stations with a network 
affiliation were operating, by and large, at a profit. Supra, pp. 62-63. 
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sion haa no other alternative but to make a decision. Rightly or wrongly, 
the Commission decided to allocate space for television broadcasting in 
both the UHF ana VHE portions of the spectrum with the hope that the new 
portion of the spectrum would meet the requirements of commercial broad-
casting. 
The Commission, however, was not alone in its hope. The Radio 
Nanufacturers Association ana other groups within "the industry also held 
high hopes for the UHF' channels and made their expectations known to the 
prospective users of that portion of the spectrum. Reservations about the 
reliability of the UHF channels for commercial broadcasting, as well as 
advice about intermixing UID' and VHF in one television system, also were 
made known. But these reservations apparently were ignored in the expect-
ation that UHF would be as profitable as VHF. The Commission, therefore, 
could not be held completely responsible for the "promise• hela inherent 
in the Sixth Report and Oraer. 
But if the Federal Communications Commission cannot be held com-
plete.Ly responsible for the hope sharea by many that the UHF stations would 
develop on a sauna economic basis, it could be held responsible for not 
taking action to encourage U.aF·. Encouragement could have been given by one 
positive step; that is, by commissioning an unbiased investigation of the 
allocations question as early as 1954, when it had become obvious that UHF 
stations could not compete on an equal basis with VhF stations. Instead, 
the Commission apparently gave way to pressures which demanded an investi-
gation of a peripheral :matter, the network stuay, on which a report was 
finally released in 1958.1 While the network report was valuable, it did 
lThe Ba:z;:z;ow Il~ort: Network Broadcasting (1958), H. Report No. 1297. 
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not focus on the technical difficulties allegea to be inherent in the 
Sixth Report ana Order. In short, the Commission continued to rely on 
studies of various solutions submitted by segments of the industry which 
were interes•ed parties in an already muddled allocations problem. 
what could have been the reasons for the Commission 1 s failure to 
have requestea an independent study of the allocations problems as early 
as 1954? The writer submits as pure conjecture that the Commission did not 
act to investigate the allocations problem because the Senate Corami ttee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce had commissioned its minority ana majority 
counsels to investigate ana make a report on the allocations problem. 
Additionally, the Senate CoffiQittee haa appoL~tea an Ad Hoc Committee to 
make a technical study of the allocations problem, a study which took ap-
proximately two and one half years to con~lete and resulted in a report 
released in 1958--a report, incidentally, which sharply criticizea the 
Commission.1 
1-lould the fact that the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce was in the process of investigating the allocations problem have 
absolved the Commission of the responsibility oi' conducting a study of its 
own? As we have seen, one oi' the auties of the Commission has been to en-
courage the effective and widespreaa use of radio, which should also in-
valve the stuay of ways ana means for such encouragement. That it has not 
seemed w do so apparently has been a sore point with those UHF' licensees 
and small conununity broadcasters who have felt that the Commission, by its 
inaction, has favored powerful VHF interests. Their contentions have been 
lThe Bowles Report: Ad Hoc Peport on Allocation of TV Channels, 
(1958). 
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buttressed by the Ad Hoc Committee report. 
In all fairness to the Federal Coiiiillunications Commission, however, 
it must be remembered that the Commission has faced many problems in the 
regulation of a growing communications network, of which broadcasting has 
been only a part. vJhile the communications industry has gro>rn, the con-
cepts governing the activities of the Commission have not been changed 
correspondingly by Congress. One may argue that the Commission should 
"regulate" program content. Or, one may argue that the less the regulation, 
the better the industry will be. These have been some of the concepts which 
Congress and the Commission have faced in their attemrts to find a solution 
to the UHF-VHF question. The question of finding more space for broadcast-
ing has been only a small par·t of the larger issue of allotting more 
spectrum space for all industries as well as the government itself. But as 
small a part as the broadcasting segment has been, the issues raised by the 
UHF-VHF broadcasters in the allocations question have gone far beyond eco-
nomic considerations--or even technical factors--and have reached into the 
social and political aspects of COIIIIllunication. 
The communications industry has grown because people have come to 
depend on it for pleasure and b~Jsiness. Yet, how many television stations 
do we want as compared with radar stations which guard our borders and 
guide aircraft to a safe landing. How important are television station 
losses as compared with those losses invclved in fire and police calls? 
w'here do we begin to draw the line between pleasure, business, and personal 
safety? Irrelevant questions? Perhaps, but these have been questions 
involved in the UHF issue--questions we must face, either as a part of the 
"public" or as communicators, if we are to give an intelligent mandate to 
Congress and the Federal Coiiiillunications Commission. 
- :;-- ... -
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